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NOTES
THE CONUNDRUM OF CRIMINAL DISCOVERY:
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS, ABA
STANDARDS, FEDERAL RULES, AND KENTUCKY
LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Historical Background
To require the disclosure to an adversary of the evidence that
is to be produced, would be repugnant to all sportsmanlike
instincts. Rather permit you to preserve the secret of your
tactics, to lock up your documents in the vault, to send your
witness to board in some obscure village, and then, reserving
your evidential resources until the final moment, to marshal
them at the trial before your surprised and dismayed antago-
nist, and thus overwhelm him.1
The traditional approach to trial advocacy and adjudica-
tion, appropriately called the "sporting theory of justice" by
Dean Roscoe Pound,2 has contributed more than anything else
to resistance to pretrial criminal discovery and still governs the
American criminal courtroom. Lately, however, this approach
has come under increasing attack, often from some of today's
leading jurists.' In order to understand this criticism and to
outline suggested improvements, this note will set forth the
rationale for pretrial criminal discovery, will discuss the consti-
tutional issues it has raised in the courts, and will compare
present Kentucky law on criminal discovery with the ABA
Standards on Discovery4 and the federal rules.5
6 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1845, at 375-76 (3d ed. 1940).
2 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 564 (1959), citing 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 375 (3d
ed. 1940). Pound credits Wigmore with coining this phrase.
3 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution:
Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279, 292 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Brennan]; Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 228 (1964).
'AmERicAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (Approved Draft 1970)
[hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY]. The ABA Standards have already
been prepared as model rules for state courts. See AmiucAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PATrERN
RULES OF COURT AND CODE PROVISIONS, 118-135 (Rev. ed. 1976).
1 For a thorough article which examines the present federal rules of criminal
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Pretrial criminal discovery did not exist at common law.6
In England it was denied because of a fear that liberal discov-
ery would "subvert the whole system of criminal law."7 Since
this fear was expressed in 1792, however, England has trans-
formed its system of preliminary inquiry into a process replete
with opportunities for discovery.' At the modem preliminary
hearing, an English prosecutor must introduce not only enough
evidence to establish "probable cause," but also all evidence
he intends to introduce at trial. Furthermore, the prosecution
has a continuing duty to notify the defense of any additional
evidence it proposes to introduce. The defendant, on the other
hand, is under no duty to disclose.'
The American approach to pretrial criminal discovery has
not developed as liberally and is still a long way from requiring
complete disclosure before trial. Until recently, in fact, Ameri-
can courts, including Kentucky's, were even hostile to pretrial
criminal discovery' although such an attitude seems a strange
procedure on discovery with more detail than this Note will attempt see Comment,
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-Expansion of Discovery, 66
J. CRIM. L.&C 23 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Expansion of Discovery]. See
also Comment, Pretrial Discovery Under the Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 46 Miss. L.J. 302 (1975).
2 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EvInENCE § 671 (12th ed. 1955); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1859Q (3d ed. 1940).
7 King v. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248, 1249 (K.B. 1792). In this case the Bench
held not only that the defendant had no right to inspect a report of the board of inquiry
but also that the court did not have even discretionary power to grant such a request.
It is clear that neither at common law, or under any of the statutes, is the
defendant entitled as a matter of right, to have his application granted. And
if we were to assume a discretionary power of granting this request, it would
be dangerous in the extreme, and totally unfounded on precedent. Id. at
1250.
Actually as early as 1833 the English court had begun to reject the rationale of
Holland. See Comment, Pretrial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 60 YALE L.J. 626, 627,
at n. 7 (1951) citing Regina v. Colucci, 176 Eng. Reprints 46 (1861); Rex v. Harrie, 172
Eng. Reprints 1165 (1833).
1 D. KARLEN, ANGLO-AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 158-161 (1967); Louisell,
Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 56, 64-67 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Louisell].
There are, however, two limitations to discovery in English criminal law: (1) The
preliminary hearing is available only in cases tried by indictment, and (2) discovery
by the defendant is limited to admissible evidence which the prosecutor intends to
present at trial. Louisell, at 65.
,o The trial, when the issue is joined, is not a friendly recitation, but a
real trial. No morbid sentiment or sympathy for one charged with crime
should overshadow the 'rights of the public. In these days criminals are both
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contrast to both the Kentucky and Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure which provide for very liberal discovery in civil cases.1
Certainly no rules of criminal procedure have adopted the
sweeping scope of the civil rules nor has pretrial criminal dis-
covery ever been held to come within the constitutional re-
quirement of due process.' 2
A breakdown in this traditional resistance to pretrial crim-
inal discovery, however, can be discerned in several recent de-
velopments. In two cases, the United States Supreme Court,
although still acknowledging that discovery in criminal cases
is not required by the Constitution, has encouraged the devel-
opment of more liberal discovery rules and statutes, provided
such discovery is reciprocal.' 3 In addition, discovery in federal
cases has been broadened both by the adoption of the new
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as
Federal Rules) on pretrial criminal discovery. 4 Lastly, the pro-
mulgation of the American Bar Association's standards' 5 for
liberal discovery in criminal cases represents a rejection of
the traditional "sporting theory of justice." As these develop-
skilled and cunning, and it is a contest between the people and the criminals
for the mastery. Neither the rules of courtesy, or supposed equitable consid-
erations, should be allowed to subvert the practice sanctioned by long experi-
ence. State v. Rhoads, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (Ohio 1910).
See also Evans v. Commonwealth, 19 S.W.2d 1091, 1093 (Ky. 1929) ("A litigant
need never be surprised when his adversary proves his'case."); Brawner v. Common'-
wealth, 344 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Ky. 1961) ("It should always be anticipated that the
opposing party intends to prove his case with whatever means are available.")
" FED. R. CIv. P. 16; Ky. Civ. R. 26-37; See Ky. REv. STAT. § 447.151 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as KRS].
12 Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 79 (1952)
(defendant denied access to his own confessions). But see Nakell, The Effect of Due
Process on Criminal Defense Discovery, 62 Ky. L.J. 58, 90 (1973) in which the author
argues that the "due process clause provides the cornerstone for criminal defense
discovery . . . ." It should also be noted that the sixth amendment, which requires
that "the accused . . . be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation . .. ."
means that the defendant must have enough knowledge to prepare an adequate de-
fense. Kampfe & Dostal, Discovery in the Federal Criminal System, 36 MoNT. L. Rev.
189, 191 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kampfe, Discovery]. One commentator has
argued that this clause may be a proper legal vehicle for defendants claiming a right
to pretrial discovery. Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71,
184 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Westen, Compulsory Process].
" Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
u The focus of this Note will be on FED. R. CRmM. P. 12, 12.1, 12.2 and 16 (effective
December 1, 1975).
15 ABA STANDARDS, DIscovERY, supra note 4.
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ments indicate, the law of criminal discovery has become one
of the most rapidly expanding areas of criminal law today. This
evolution will certainly have an effect on Kentucky law. In
responding to these developments the courts and bar of Ken-
tucky should recognize that while the desirability of liberal
pretrial criminal discovery is well established,'6 the scope of
discovery as well as sanctions for noncompliance are the sub-
jects of continuing and energetic debate.
B. The Polemics on Broader Criminal Discovery
In 1970 the American Bar Association, motivated by pract-
ical as well as ideological concerns, proposed the most liberal
criminal discovery standards considered to date.'7 Liberal dis-
covery was believed necessary not only to ensure the determi-
nation of truth and the equitable administration of justice, but
also "to lend more finality to criminal dispositions, to speed up
and simplify the process, and to make more economical use of
resources.'8 These standards rejected a "grudging" attitude
toward pretrial criminal discovery and embraced instead a
standard which allows "disclosure of nearly everything, subject
to certain .. safeguards as they are needed in the particular
case."'
9
Proposals such as the ABA Standards calling for broad-
ened discovery generally proceed from a recognition of the
state's legitimate and vital interest in the fair administration
of justice, the integrity of the proceedings themselves, the as-
certainment of truth, the prevention of trial error, and the fi-
nality of its criminal cases.2" The basic premise underlying the
" 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 252, 500 (1969).
7ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY, supra note 4.
IS Id. at 2. The ABA standards also provide for procedures which would insure
adherence to the discovery rules. Although not within the scope of this Note, it should
be pointed out that among the most innovative of those procedures is the "omnibus
hearing" in which the court hears all motions, demurrers, and other requests prior to
trial and goes through a check list with the attorneys for each side. This guarantees
that all necessary matters and potential post-conviction issues have been properly met.
ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY, supra note 4, at § 5.3, p. 114, Appendix C: Checklist for
Action at 138-144; cf. R. NiMmER, PROSECUTOR DISCLOSURE AND JUDICIAL REFORM (1975);
Clark, The Omnibus Hearing in State and Federal Courts, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 761
(1974); Miller, The Omnibus Hearing-An Experiment in Federal Criminal Discovery,
5 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 293 (1968).
"ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY, supra note 4, at 40.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF TRIAL JUDGES, THE STATE TRIAL JUDGE'S BOOK 245 (2d
1976]
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argument for discovery in any case, criminal or civil, is that
"truth is best revealed by a decent opportunity to prepare in
advance of trial."2' Maximum exchange of information will
better serve the ends of justice by allowing the parties to pre-
pare their cases thoroughly and reduce the chance of surprise
at trial.22 As one of the leading proponents of criminal discov-
ery, California Justice Roger Traynor, explains: "The truth is
most likely to emerge when each side seeks to take the other
by reason rather than by surprise. The more open the process
for eliciting it, the less need there is of surprise."23
Proponents of liberal discovery further argue that because
the defendant is presumed innocent, it must be assumed that
he is ignorant of the charge and the grounds on which it is
based.24 Even if the defendant were actually at the scene of the
crime or in some way involved, he might not have a clear recol-
lection of the circumstances or even his own conduct because
of confusion, alcohol, drugs, or even the stress and anxiety
caused by the excitement. 21 Yet without pretrial discovery, an
ed. 1969) [hereinafter STATE TRiAL JUDGE'S BOOK].
21 State v. Johnson, 145 A.2d 313, 315 (1958).
22 For law review articles in favor of liberal criminal discovery see generally Rice,
Criminal Defense Discovery: A Prelude To Justice or an Interlude for Abuse?, 45 Miss.
L.J. 887 (1974); Shatz, California Criminal Discovery: Eliminating Anachronistic Lim-
itations Imposed on the Defendant, 9 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REv. 259 (1974); Moore, Crimi-
nal Discovery, 19 HAST. L.J. 865 (1968); Note, Pretrial Criminal Discovery: The Need
for Expansion, 35 U. CIN. L. REv. 195 (1966); Comment, The Need for Liberalized
Rules of Discovery in Criminal Procedure, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 736 (1966); Criminal Law
-Discovery in Criminal Cases, Symposium on Legislation, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1640
(1965); Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DuKE L.J.
477; Brennan, supra note 3; Krantz, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Necessity
for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 NEB. L. REv. 127 (1963); Developments in the
Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940 (1961); Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State
Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1960); Note, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal
Cases, 60 YALE L.J. 626 (1951).
23 Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228,
249 (1964).
4 United States v. J. M. Huber Co., 179 F. Supp. 570, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See
also United States v. Tanner, 279 F. Supp. 457, 474 (N.D. Ill. 1967); United States v.
Smith, 16 F.R.D. 372 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
2' Discovery of the government's evidence of relevant and incriminating
statements made by the defendant to police is of the utmost importance to
the preparation of the defense as it must be kept in mind that given the
traumatic circumstances of arrest the memory of a defendant as to exactly
what occurred may well be hazy and defective. Even where a defendant's
memory is crystal clear, it is not every defendant who chooses to tell his own
attorney all that he remembers.
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attorney may have no knowledge of the facts other than what
he learns from his client and so may be unable to advise his
client properly during plea bargaining.26 In fact, because
pretrial discovery can be useful in persuading defendants to
plead guilty and because courts rely heavily on guilty pleas to
lighten over-crowded dockets, 27 prosecutors often allow infor-
mal pretrial discovery even though this is not required.2s
Furthermore, pretrial discovery promotes judicial econ-
omy by clarifying issues, thus avoiding confusion and delay
caused by continuances during the trial itself. Instead of hav-
ing knotty legal problems sprung on the defense counsel and
perhaps the trial judge by the introduction of surprise evi-
dence, pretrial discovery can bring such issues to the forefront
early. This allows time for additional research and deliberation
on the admissibility of the evidence at trial29 and also protects
a judgment from post conviction attack by insuring "that all
the relevant constitutional questions were either resolved or
Moreover, a principal purpose of discovery is to advise defense counsel
what the defendant faces in standing trial: it permits a more accurate evalu-
ation of the factors to be weighed in considering a disposition of the charges
without trial. While we cannot know whether such disclosure would in this
case have led to disposition without trial, we do know that such disclosure
does result in such dispositions in many cases. United States v. Lewis, 511
F.2d 798, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
"JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, THE PROBLEM OF DiscovERY
IN CRIMINAL CASES 4-5, 59 (1961).
27 Most jurisdictions have a guilty plea rate of higher than 60 percent while a few
have rates as high as 95 percent. Comment, Preplea Discovery: Guilty Pleas and the
Likelihood of Conviction at Trial, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 527 (1971). See also PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE COURTS 9 (1967)
citing ABA, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY
(Tent. Draft 1967); 8 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 111.0211] (2d ed. 1968).
" This procedure of informal disclosure in lieu of hearings accounts for
the large number of waivers of indictment and actually decreases the court's
burden in many instances by encouraging guilty pleas. Many times a disclo-
sure of the documentary evidence has brought a guilty plea.
Hearing on the United States Commissioner System Before the Subcomm. on Im-
provements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 162, 164 (1965).
" STATE TRIAL JUDOE'S BOOK, supra note 17, at 245. See also PREsmENT'S COMMIS-
sION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 139 (1967):
A partial answer to the great number of habeas corpus proceedings is the
improvement of trials. This means not only insuring that constitutional
rights are protected but that the protection is fully documented on the re-
cord. Judges should take pains to insure that constitutional issues present
in the case are confronted and directed.
1976]
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knowingly waived at the original trial . ... -30 Thus, pretrial
discovery insures not only the integrity of the verdict but its
finality as well.
Early discovery may also alert defense counsel to issues
which might otherwise have been overlooked and give him
ample opportunity to respond to the situation intelligently.
This should reduce post trial claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.31 In addition, pretrial discovery would insure effective
confrontation of the prosecution's witnesses" by giving the de-
fendant an opportunity to examine the witnesses' background
for possible bias before trial. Moreover, this would reduce the
time needed by the defense on cross-examination and expedite
the trial by rendering extensive fishing expeditions unneces-
sary.
Those opposed to liberal criminal discovery fear that broad
pretrial disclosure would result in the tampering with evidence,
perjury, and the intimidation of witnesses. 3 As Dean Pound
has framed the issue, it is the "problem of, on the one hand,
unfair surprise to a party by unexpected evidence which he is
not at the moment prepared to meet, and, on the other hand,
danger of falsification of means of meeting it if the one who
offers it is required to divulge it before trial. '34
One's immediate reaction is to analyze civil cases to ascer-
tain the result of accepted liberal discovery. The experience in
the civil arena has proven that broad discovery does not en-
courage falsification and perjury but rather results in better
10 Zagel & Carr, State Criminal Discovery and the New Illinois Rules, 1971 U. ILL.
L.F. 557, 562 [hereinafter cited as Zagel & Car, State Criminal Discovery]; See also
STATE TRIAL JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note 17, at 245.
" ABA STANDARDS, DiscovERY, supra note 4, at 5. This may be of particular im-
portance here because the Sixth Circuit measures effective assistance of counsel by a
relatively high standard, that of "a reasonably competent criminal trial attorney."
Beasley v. United States, 479 F.2d at 1124 (6th Cir. 1973).
32 Kampfe, Discovery, supra note 12, at 191, cf. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,
420 (1964).
3 For articles opposing liberal criminal discovery see generally Barrett, Danger
Ahead for Adversary System, TRIAL MAGAZINE 19, 21 (Dec. 66-Jan. 67); Panel on
Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 320 (1965). Flannery,
Speech delivered to Symposium at the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia
Circuit, Prosecutor's Position's Arguments and Illustrations Against Liberalization of
Defense Discovery Rules, Need for Prosecutor's Discovery of Specific Defenses (Alibi,
Insanity, etc.) printed in 33 F.R.D. 74 (1963), [hereinafter cited as Flannery].
" 5 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 563 (1959).
[Vol. 64
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preparation and more thorough and effective cross-
examination.3 5 The pursuit of truth is furthered since witnesses
subjected to the fire of effective, knowledgable cross-
examination cannot as easily deceive.
Chief Justice Arthur Vanderbilt, however, rejected any
comparison between criminal and civil trials when he stated
that perjury and witness intimidation are far more likely in
criminal than civil cases. 3 Another jurist, Justice William
1- Facilitation of perjury has been a bogey man of discovery for over a
hundred years. No evidence can be produced conclusively to prove or dis-
prove it, and the consensus among lawyers is to reject it. This investigation
disclosed the variety of ways in which lawyers use discovery to thwart per-
jury. Defendants customarily take a deposition and make a physical exami-
nation of the plaintiff immediately after suit is filed to freeze his account
both of the accident and of his injuries before he has learned too much about
what facts will support his recovery. The answers to interrogatories and
admissions, documents obtained by motions to produce, and testimony on
deposition are checked against one another and against testimony at the trial
to outwit the perjurer.
Speck, The Use of Discovery in the United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132,
1154 (1951) [footnotes omitted]. Cf. Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal
Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 293, 311 (1960).
There have been many assertions that liberal discovery invites perjury and
fabrication, but virtually no tangible proof or documentation of these asser-
tions. What meager statistical evidence there is suggests that perjury is a
very slight danger. . . . Indeed, it seems quite as likely that better knowl-
edge on both sides concerning the material evidence, and an awareness on
the defendant's part how much of the case is recorded on paper, would serve
to deter rather than encourage perjury and fabrication. Brennan, supra note
3, at 290, n. 39.
11 Defendant argues that in keeping with the modem trend toward lib-
eral discovery in civil proceedings we should grant him the unqualified right
to an inspection of all papers and other documents in the possession of the
State . . . . Such an argument compeltely ignores the fundamental differ-
ence between civil and criminal proceedings . . . . In criminal proceedings
long experience has taught the courts that often discovery will lead not to
honest fact-finding, but on the contrary to perjury and the suppression of
evidence. Thus the criminal who is aware of the whole case against him will
often procure perjured testimony in order to set up a false defense .. ..
Another result of full discovery would be that the criminal defendant who is
informed of the names of all of the State's witnesses may take steps to bribe
or frighten them into giving perjured testimony or into absenting themselves
so that they are unavailable to testify. Moreover, many witnesses, if they
know that the defendant will have knowledge of their names prior to trial,
will be reluctant to come forward with information during the investigation
of the crime . . . . All these dangers are more inherent in criminal proceed-
ings where the defendant has much more at stake, often his own life, than
in civil proceedings. The presence of perjury in criminal proceedings today
is extensive despite the efforts of the courts to eradicate it and constitutes a
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Brennan, has retorted that he is not persuaded by the "old
hobgoblin perjury, invariably raised with every suggested
change in procedure to make easier the discovery of the
truth."" Brennan goes on to argue that even if such dangers do
exist and abuses are threatened, safeguards against those
abuses should be the aim, not denial of discovery 8 In this
argument he is joined by the usually conservative Dean Wig-
more who wrote:
The possibility that a dishonest accused will misuse such an
opportunity is no reason for committing the injustice of refus-
ing the honest accused a fair means of clearing himself. That
argument is outworn; it was the basis (and with equal logic)
for the one-time refusal of the criminal law . . . to allow the
accused to produce any witnesses at all. 9
After sifting through all the polemics on pretrial criminal
discovery, it becomes clear that the fundamental issue is the
balancing of advantages and disadvantages between the de-
fense and the prosecution. The defense-oriented argue that
pretrial discovery of the prosecutor's case is necessary to put
the accused on an equal footing with the state at trial. The
defendant, they point out, does not have access to any resource
approaching the state's modern police force and vast investiga-
very serious threat to the administration of criminal justice and thus to the
welfare of the country as a whole.
State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J. 1953) (C.J. Vanderbilt). But see Developments
in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 1051-63 (1961).
1 Brennan, Speech delivered to symposium at the Judicial Conference of the
District of Columbia Circuit, Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, printed in 33
F.R.D. 47, at 62 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Brennan, Remarks on Discovery]. See
also United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
13 Brennan, Remarks on Discovety, supra note 37, at 65. See also State v. Tune,
98 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1953) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
... Certainly without actual evidence and upon conjecture merely, and in
the face of the contrary proof of our experience in civil cases, we ought not
in criminal cases, where even life itself may be at stake, forswear in the
absence of clearly established danger a tool so useful in guarding against the
chance that a trial will be a lottery or mere game of wits and the result at
the mercy of the mischiefs of surprise. We must remember that society's
interest is equally that the innocent shall not suffer and not alone that the
guilty shall not escape. Discovery, basically a tool for truth, is the most
effective device yet devised for the reduction of the aspect of the adversary
element to a minimum.
6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1863, at 488 (3d ed. 1940).
[Vol. 64
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tory apparatus. 0 Moreover, the state can rely upon search war-
rants and secret grand jury investigations to gather evidence
before trial. In contrast, the defendant may actually be barred
from gathering facts because he or she is in custody" or simply
cannot afford to pay for an investigation.4 2 The state has the
added advantage of being first at the scene of a crime, and
therefore gains exclusive possession of most of the physical
evidence. Furthermore, investigators wearing the cloak of gov-
ernmental authority can get voluntary cooperation from poten-
tial witnesses when the defendant cannot. 3 These prosecutorial
pretrial advantages, augmented by the loosening of pleading
and proof standards, argues one commentator, require the in-
troduction of compensatory safeguards for the accused in the
form of broad pretrial discovery."
The prosecution-oriented contend that the defendant has
enough protections in the presumption of innocence, the exclu-
sionary rule, and the prosecution's burden of proving its case
11 Fairly clearly, pretrial discovery by the prosecution is far-reaching.
And it cannot in any sense be said to be matched by what is available to
the defendant or by what he can keep from the prosecution-even when his
"immunity" from self-incrimination is thrown into the scales. While the
possibility that the defendant may produce a hitherto undisclosed witness
or theory of defense is always present, the opportunity for surprise is ren-
dered practically illusory by the government's broad investigatory powers
and by the requirement in many states that the defenses of alibi and insanity
must be specially pleaded. The sum of the matter is that the defendant is
not an effective participant in the pretrial criminal process. It is to the trial
alone that he must look for justice. Yet the imbalance of the pretrial period
may prevent him from making the utmost of the critical trial date. And the
trial, in turn, has been refashioned so that it is increasingly unlikely that it
will compensate for the imbalance before trial.
Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,
69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1192 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein].
" JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, THE PROBLEM OF DiscovERY
IN CRIMNAL CASES 4 (1961).
12 It has been argued that an indigent has a right not only to counsel but also to
investigation in his behalf. The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert and
Investigational Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 CoRNELL L. REv. 632, 632-637
(1970). Because public defender systems such as the one in Kentucky often have their
own investigators, however, the disadvantage of not having access to independent
investigation will fall not on indigents but on middle or lower class defendants who
are not eligible for public defender assistance but who cannot afford the high expense
of private investigation. See also Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent
Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L. REv. 1054 (1963).
13 Comment, Expansion of Discovery, supra note 5, at 41-42, n. 132.
11 Goldstein, supra note 40, at 1199.
19761
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beyond a reasonable doubt.45 Finally and most importantly
they argue that because the defendant's fifth amendment priv-
ilege protects him from self-incrimination, he could not be
forced to produce evidence before trial and would thus be in a
position to surprise the prosecution. Pretrial discovery would
be a "one-way street" resulting in an imbalance in favor of the
accused46 and making "the prosecutor's task almost insur-
mountable."47 This fear was put to rest, however, with the Su-
preme Court's decision in Williams v. Florida" which held that
the fifth amendment does not bar requiring pretrial disclosure
of the defense.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY PRETRIAL
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
A. The Fifth Amendment v. Prosecutorial Discovery
The concept of nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, "no man is
bound to accuse himself," 9 is embodied in the fifth amend-
ment of the Constitution," which, in spite of a great deal of
11 In an oft-quoted passage Judge Learned Hand once noted:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the
prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest
outline of his defense. He is immune from question or comment on his si-
lence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the minds
of any one of the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the
whole evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense,
fairly or fouly, I have never been able to see. No doubt grand juries err and
indictments are calamities to honest men, but we must work with human
beings and we can correct such errors only at too large a price. Our dangers
do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has always
been haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal
dream. What we need to fear is the archiac formalism and the watery senti-
ment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime.
United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). See also text accompanying
note 98, infra, and the recent United States Supreme Court opinion criticizing the
exclusionary rule. Stone v. Powell, -U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 3037 (1976).
48 Flannery, supra note 33.
State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 885 (N.J. 1953).
48 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
, L. LEVY, ORUGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 3 (1968); for another readable but
thorough account of the historical development of the fifth amendment see Harris,
Annals of Law: Taking the Fifth (Part HI), THE NEW YORKER 43-100 (April 26, 1976).
Cf. Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935); Note, Self-Incrimination-
Historical Background of the Doctrine, 44 Ky. L.J. 124 (1956).
"' "No person. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
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criticism,5' remains a vital cornerstone of the American crimi-
nal justice system.5 2 Nevertheless, its protection is not limit-
less; the accused is protected only from being "compelled" to
give "incriminating testimony."53 In Williams v. Florida,-4 a
case challenging the Florida notice of alibi rule, the United
States Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether pretrial
discovery of the accused's defense by the prosecution is a viola-
tion of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. The Florida rule55 required that a defendant in-
tending to rely on an alibi defense give the prosecution notice
and a list of witnesses he proposes to call to establish that
defense. In Williams," the Supreme Court upheld the notice of
alibi requirement and accepted the theory that fairness to both
sides requires mutual discovery:
The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is
not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right
always to conceal their cards until played. We find ample
room in that system, at least as far as "due process" is con-
cerned, for the instant Florida rule, which is designed to en-
hance the search for truth in the criminal trial by insuring
both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to inves-
tigate certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or
innocence .3
himself. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
*' See L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FirH AMENDMENT (1959); Baker, Self-
Incrimination: Is the Privilege an Anachronism?, 42 A.B.A.J. 633 (1956); Friendly, The
Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case For Constitutional Change, 37 U. CiN. L. Rv.
671 (1968); McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of
Confessions, 24 Tax. L. REv. 239, 277 (1946) stating that:
[Tihe courts as they become more conversant with the history of the privi-
lege will see that it is a survival that has outlived the context that gave it
meaning, and that its application today is not to be extended under the
influence of a vague sentimentality but is to be kept within the limits of
realism and common sense.
52 "Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system. Such has been
the characteristic of Anglo-American criminal justice since it freed itself from practices
borrowed by the Star Chamber from the Continent . Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49, 54 (1949).
See generally Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
399 U.S. 78 (1970).
FLA. R. Cram. P. 1.200, readopted by the Florida Supreme Court as present FLA.
R. CRIM. P. 3.200. This rule is set out in its entirety in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, at Appendix A (1970).
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
5 Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
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In a later case, the Court reemphasized the need for "a
balance of forces between the accused and his accuser""8 and
held that a notice of alibi statute which did not require the
prosecutor to disclose rebuttal witnesses was unconstitutional.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, held the
Court, "forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal dis-
covery rights are given to criminal defendants."59 In the same
opinion, the Supreme Court lauded the development of broad
discovery, stating that "[t]he growth of such discovery devices
is a salutary development which, by increasing the evidence
available to both parties, enhances the fairness of the adversary
system." o
The majority in Williams, in permitting prosecutorial dis-
covery of the defense dismissed the claims of fifth amendment
problems on two grounds: 1) The defendant was not being
"compelled" within the meaning of the fifth amendment since
"nothing requires the defendant to rely on alibi or prevents him
from abandoning the defense; the matters are left to his unfet-
tered choice," and 2) the Florida rule only forced the defendant
to "accelerate the timing of his disclosure," since he planned
from the beginning to divulge the defense at trial." In support
of its first argument, the Williams majority did not reach the
question of whether the information sought by the state before
trial was "testimonial" and "incriminating."" If such informa-
tion is "testimonial" and "incriminating," that is if the defen-
dant is aiding in his own prosecution, then the disclosure re-
quirement forces the defendant to choose between abandon-
ment of his constitutional right of silence and waiver of the
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973), cf. Nakell, The Effect of Due
Process in Criminal Defense Discovery, 62 Ky. L.J. 58 (1973).
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 (1973).
" Id. at 474. Justices Black and Douglas, however, found this approach towards
mutual discovery to be a "radical and dangerous departure from the historical and
constitutionally guaranteed right of a defendant in a criminal case to remain com-
pletely silent, requiring the state to prove its case without any assistance of any kind
from the defendant himself." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 108-09 (1970) (Black &
Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
" Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1970).
62 "However 'testimonial' and 'incriminating' the alibi defense proves to be, it
cannot be considered 'compelled' within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 84 (1970). But see 399 U.S. 78, 86, at
n. 17.
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defense of alibi. Such a choice is not "unfettered." Waiver of
the defense becomes the penalty for remaining silent, and the
Court has stated that compulsion exists "when the assertion of
the privilege is costly."63 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that there can be no penalty imposed on one who exercises
a constitutional right.64
The issue, then, should not be whether disclosure of the
information is being compelled, but whether it is "testimonial"
and "incriminating" within the meaning of the fifth amend-
ment. It has been argued that the production of witness lists
as required by the Florida rule is testimonial because it entails
"a communication from the defendant to the prosecutor the
veracity of which would depend on the perception and cogni-
tive processes of the defendant, and on which the prosecutor
would rely. '6 5 In addition, the disclosure of alibi witnesses may
"1 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
94 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973)(testimony cannot be compelled on
threat of loss of contract without giving immunity); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S.
601 (1971) (no information of past or present violation of law can be used against
firearm registrant); United States v. Covington, 395 U.S. 57 (1969); Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969)(marijuana transfer tax); Gross v. United States, 390 U.S. 62
(1968); Gardner v. Brodrick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39 (1968) (wagering tax); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (registration of
sawed-off shotgun); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (police officer); Spe-
vack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (attorney); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (school teacher cannot
be dismissed for invoking the fifth); accord California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971)
(no bar to prosecution for hit and run); Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969)
(falsifying information to the government-challenge to validity of the requirement no
defense); United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969) (fifth no defense to prosecutiori
for false return; duress may be).
Another recent Supreme Court case also ruled that an accused could not be penal-
ized for his silence. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U:S. 610 (1976), the defendants took the
stand and gave an exculpatory story which they had not earlier given to the police or
prosecutor. The prosecutor attempted to impeach the defendants by cross-examining
them as to why they had not given the exculpatory explanation to the arresting officer.
The Court held: "[T]he use for impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence, at the
time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 2245. Cf. Note, Unconstitutional Conditions,
73 HARV. L. Ray. 1595 (1960). See also Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure Revisited, 64 Ky. L.J. 729 (1976).
Note, Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARV. L. REv. 994,
1003 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Prosecutorial Discovery]. See also Note,
Criminal Procedure: Pretrial Prosecutorial Discovery and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 5 UCLA-ALts. L. Ray. 80, 97-98 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Criminal Procedure].
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be incriminating if such a practice might result in furnishing
"a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.""6 While
the defendant may anticipate that his witnesses will exculpate
him, they may in fact provide leads to additional incriminating
information on the charge being prosecuted 7 or on another
charge stemming from the same circumstances.
As persuasive as these arguments may seem, however,
they do not meet the Court's latter argument that the privilege
does not apply when disclosure is required only of material
intended for introduction by the defendant at trial, since the
disclosure requirement is merely getting at material which will
be disclosed during trial anyway. In support of this basis for its
holding, the majority declared that "[n]othing in the Fifth
Amendment privilege entitles a defendant as a matter of con-
stitutional right to await the end of the state's case before
announcing the nature of his defense. . 68 Requiring disclo-
sure in advance merely regulates the presentation of the defen-
dant's case and thereby simply allows courts' discretion in ar-
ranging the proper order of evidence. In so reasoning the Court
pointed to a similar holding in Jones v. Superior Court.9
In Jones, the California Supreme Court had ordered the
defendant to disclose before trial medical reports and the
names of physicians and surgeons he intended to use to support
his defense of impotence against a rape charge. In a later case,
this same court limited pretrial disclosure to "factual informa-
tion" which "the defendant intends to introduce at trial" per-
taining to "a particular defense or defenses" and then only
after the trial judge determined that "under the facts and cir-
cumstances in the case before him" the "disclosure cannot pos-
sibly tend to incriminate [the] defendant."70
" Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
7 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 110 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); Scott
v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 785 (Alas. 1974); Note, Prosecutorial Discovery, supra note 65,
at 1004-1005; Note, Criminal Procedure, supra note 65, at 98-101.
11 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970). See also Jones v. Superior Court,
372 P.2d 919 (1962); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 228, 247 (1964).
"9 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962). See also Traynor, Ground Lost and
Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228, 247 (1964).
70 Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 466 P.2d 673, 678, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129, 134 (1970)
(emphasis added). See also Kane, Criminal Discovery-The Circuitous Road to a Two-
Way Street, 7 U. SAN. Fam. L. REv. 203 (1973).
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The "acceleration" argument ignores the reason that pro-
secutorial evidence must precede the defense in our system of
criminal justice. The order of the introduction of evidence is
inextricably tied to the presumption of innocence. Under this
theory, the accused in a criminal case has no duty whatsoever
to present even a scintilla of evidence until the prosecution has
presented a prima facie case against him.7 1
The importance of the order of evidence presentation was
recognized in a case subsequent to Williams. In Brooks v.
Tennessee, 2 the Court held that a statute requiring a criminal
defendant to testify before any other defense witness if he was
to testify at all violated the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
The Court per Justice Brennan"3 explained:
Whether the defendant is to testify is an important tactical
decision as well as a matter of constitutional right. By requir-
ing the accused and his lawyer to make that choice without
an opportunity to evaluate the actual worth of their evidence,
the statute restricts the defense-particularly counsel-in
the planning of its case . . . .The accused is thereby de-
prived of the "guiding hand of counsel" in the timing of this
critical element of his defense. 4
The requirement of Williams that the defendant abandon his
right to remain silent before he has had a chance to evaluate
the prosecution's case or face preclusion of his defense is little
different from the choice required of the defendant by the stat-
ute in Brooks, an inconsistency pointed out by Chief Justice
Burger. ' -
Moreover, the two critical elements of the accusatorial
criminal justice system, the presumption of innocence and the
right to remain silent create protections necessary to ensure
responsible conduct by police and prosecutors. Many fear that
compelling disclosure before the prosecution has established a
"1 United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
72 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
13 It is a curious note, however, that Justice Brennan who writes so forcefully and
convincingly for the right of the defendant to control for timing of the presentation of
his evidence in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), is silent but votes with the
majority in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). See generally Rezneck, Justice
Brennan and Discovery in Criminal Cases, 4 Rur.-CAm. L.J. 85 (1972).
7' 406 U.S. at 612-13.
7 Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 615 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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prima facie case may result in exploratory prosecutions.76 As
Professor Wigmore explains: "The real objection is that any
system of administration which permits the prosecution to
trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of
proof must itself suffer morally thereby. The inclination devel-
ops to rely mainly upon such evidence, and to be satisfied with
an incomplete investigation of other sources. '77
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has ins-
isted that "discovery must be a two-way street. '78 Although
Williams v. Florida71 has settled challenges to pretrial discov-
ery by the prosecution based on the federal constitution, it has
not precluded all constitutional challenges. In Scott v. State,80
the Alaska court reversed a lower court order requiring the
defendant to disclose the names and addresses of prospective
defense witnesses as well as their statements in support of the
accused's alibi defense. The court held that this violated the
Alaska Constitution's protection against self-incrimination."
Essentially, the Alaska court "evaded" the Williams decision
by use of the "adequate state ground doctrine"82 and by basing
its decision on a state-insured right which was coextensive with
a federal right,83 the privilege against self-incrimination., In
76 Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the Prosecution-The Develop-
ing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REv. 437, 508 (1972); Note, Prosecutorial
Discovery, supra note 65, at 999-1000; Note, Criminal Procedure, supra note 65, at 100.
Screening devices, such as the preliminary hearing and the grand jury, are not consid-
ered by one commentator as very effective in shielding the accused from weak cases.
CRIME, LAW AND SocIry 184-189 (Goldstein & Goldstein eds. 1971).
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 309 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis deleted).
SWardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 (1973).
79 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
11 519 P.2d 774 (Alas. 1974).
SALAs. CoNsT. art. I, § 9. See also Ky. CONST. § 11.
This is the doctrine whereby the United States Supreme Court refuses to dis-
turb a state court judgment resting on an adequate state claim which may be based
on a state statute, rule or state constitutional provision. See Wilkes, More on the New
Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873 (1975)[hereinafter cited as Wilkes,
New Federalism] See also Wilkes, supra note 64.
13 Wilkes, New Federalism, supra note 82, at 882-884. See generally Wilkes, The
New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62
Ky. L.J. 421 (1974); Note, State Constitutional Guarantees as Adequate State Ground:
Supreme Court Review and Problems of Federalism, 13 AM. CRns. L. Ry. 737 (1976).
11 "We need not stand by idly and passively, waiting for constitutional
direction from the highest court of the land. Instead, we should be moving
concurrently to develop and expound the principles embedded in our consti-
tutional law." We are not bound to follow blindly a federal constitutional
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Scott the court held that the lower court order requiring
pretrial disclosure by the defendant violated the privilege
against self-incrimination because the information was testi-
monial, since it required "a communication of cognizable infor-
mation from one source to another"; 81 incriminating, since dis-
closure of witnesses could have led to evidence of illegal acts
of the accused;86 and compelled, since disclosure had been
mandated by court order.8" It should be noted, however, that
the Alaska court nonetheless required the defendant to give
simple notice of his intention to use an alibi defense. This was
upheld as constitutional on the theory that such notice "is in
the nature of any pretrial plea, much like a plea of 'not guilty'"
and is not a disclosure of "the substance of [the] defense
theory or any incriminating weaknesses or inconsistencies
therein." 8
The California Supreme Court, although not directly con-
fronting the issue of notice of alibi requirements, has also re-
served its right to interpret its own state's constitutional pro-
tection of the right against self-incrimination:
While Williams may have laid to rest the contention that
notice-of-alibi procedures are inconsistent with the federally
guaranteed privilege against self-incrimination, this privilege
is also secured to the people of California by our state Consti-
tution, whose construction is left to this court, informed but
untrammelled by the United States Supreme Court's reading
of parallel provisions.89
Assuming arguendo that prosecutorial discovery should be
rejected, the issue that remains, at least for state courts, is
"must increased defense discovery be abandoned because of
the unacceptability of prosecutorial discovery?"" Those who
construction of a fundamental principle if we are convinced that the result
is based on unsound reason or logic. Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 783 (Alas.
1974) (quoting Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alas. 1970).
Id. at 785. For an in-depth discussion of the Scott opinion see Note, Criminal
Procedure, supra note 65, at 84-85.
" Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 785-86 (Alas. 1970).
' Id. at 786.
Id. at 787.
Reynolds v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 528 P.2d 45, 49, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437,
441 (1974) (reaffirming its limitations on pretrial disclosure to the prosecution set out
in Prudhomme'v. Superior Court, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970)).
Note, Prosecutorial Discovery, supra note 65, at 1011-12.
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respond negatively argue that the pretrial discovery by the
defendant merely serves to equalize the imbalance that exists
between the state and the accused. Because the state wields
"the awesome power of indictment and the virtually limitless
resources of government investigators"9 to gather information
before trial, it need not, so the argument goes, rely on discovery
methods in order to avoid surprise.2
Opponents to prosecutorial discovery also believe the
criminal justice system should be less concerned with giving
the prosecution an "even chance" to win and more concerned
about preventing convictions based on surprise rather than
truth. It seems a bit ironic that the broad discovery favored by
the Supreme Court in Williams and Wardius is founded on the
belief that the "sporting theory of justice" ought to be rejected,
when prosecutorial discovery is justified by the same theory, a
belief that a criminal trial must be a balanced contest between
equal adversaries.13 This theory implicitly rejects one of the
truly fundamental traditions of the Anglo-American criminal
justice system, favoring the defendant to prevent the convic-
tion of an innocent person.94 This tradition goes to the very
heart of the Bill of Rights, for as Justice Douglas states: "The
Bill of Rights does not envision an adversary proceeding be-
tween two equal parties."95 The fifth amendment was specifi-
cally enacted to protect citizens from what was viewed as the
overwhelming power of the government over the individual."
" Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas J., concurring). See also
L. LE VY, AGAINST THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JusricE 141-48 (1974);
Note, Prosecutorial Discovery, supra note 65 at 1011-12.
1, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HAav. L. REv. 940, 1062 (1961) [here-
inafter cited as Discovery]; Note, Prosecutorial Discovery,'supra note 65, at 1013, n.
68.
" At least in the last century no serious student of our system of crimi-
nal justice would have suggested that the state and the defendant are equal
adversaries. They are equal only in the fictional sense that there are two sides
to a criminal case . . . . [We still expect the prosecution to act differently
than as a mere adversary and we still require the prosecutor to act as the
society's agent and not merely as one party in an adversarial system. People
v. Williams, 271 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ill. 1971)(Stouder, J., concurring).
" Discovery, supra note 92, at 1063.
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
" The fifth amendment privilege is the "result of the long struggle between the
opposing forces of the spirit of individual liberty on the one hand and the collective
power of the state on the other." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896). See also
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The privilege was adopted with a full "realization that while
sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty' [it] is often 'a protection
to the innocent.' ,9 There are, however, those who reject this
concept completely. As Judge Learned Hand wrote: "Our pro-
cedure is haunted by the thought of the innocent man con-
victed. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the
archaic formalism and watery sentiment that obstructs, delays
and defeats the prosecution of crime.""8
In view of all these arguments and counter-arguments, one
commentator observed that: "Few problems of litigation today
so intimately intermix practical, earthy considerations of feasi-
bility and 'common sense' with jurisprudential conundrums, as
does that of discovery in criminal cases." 9
B. The Right to Present a Defense v. The Preclusion Sanction
The second major constitutional debate raised by pretrial
criminal discovery concerns sanctions for non-compliance with
a pretrial disclosure order. Many states,'0 as well as the federal
rules,'0 ' provide that failure by the defendant to give notice of
a defense or to disclose names of witnesses to be called upon
at trial may preclude the defendant from raising that defense
or calling those witnesses. Such a sanction, it has been argued,
violates the accused's sixth amendment'," rights to compulsory
process and to present a defense.103
Justification for the preclusion sanction is anchored in two
theories. The first is that failure to disclose evidence before
Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 CLEV. BAR J. 91
(1954).
,1 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1965) citing Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955).
90 United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
" Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent, 49 CAUF. L. REV. 56
(1961).
'0 See Zagel & Carr, supra note 30, at Appendix A, Part I.
,' FED. R. CriM. P. 12.1(d), 12.2(d), 16 (d).
,02 "In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the right to ...have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor ... ." U.S. CONST., amend.VI.
103 Westin, Compulsory Process, supra note 10; Note, The Preclusion Sanction-A
Violation of the Constitutional Right to Present a Defense, 81 YALE L.J. 1342 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Note, The Preclusion Sanction]; Comment, Constitutional In-
firmities of the Revised Illinois Rules of Criminal Discovery, 7 J. MARSHALL J. PRAc. &
PRoc. 364 (1974).
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trial renders the evidence "presumably unworthy of belief,"
therefore "incompetent," and refusal to admit "incompetent"
evidence into the record has never been held to violate a defen-
dant's constitutional rights.' 4 As one state court has explained,
the preclusion sanction does "not limit in any way the right of
the defendant to testify truthfully in his own behalf. The condi-
tion of prior notice of alibi testimony, like the test as to materi-
ality and relevancy, does not violate the right of a defendant
to testify in his own behalf."105 Pretrial disclosure, in other
words, insures the reliability of the evidence while refusal to
disclose before trial implies deception, and the defendant has
no right to deceive, but only a right to testify to the truth.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed
the issue of the constitutionality of preclusion of the defense's
evidence as a sanction for non-compliance with a pretrial dis-
closure order.' 6 Nonetheless, the Court in Washington v. Texas
stated that:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel
their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to
present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version
of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may
decide where the truth lies.107
Commentators have argued that this language logically ex-
tends the right of compulsory process to include the right to
present tangible evidence as well.' 8 In Washington' the defen-
dant challenged a Texas statute which prohibited one coparti-
"' Note, The Preclusion Sanction, supra note 103, at 1344.
,0' Simos v. Burke, 163 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Wis. 1968).
" The United States Supreme Court left open questions of sanction in both
Williams and Wardius:
this case does not involve the question of the validity of the threatened
sanction .... Whether and to what extent a State can enforce discovery
rules against a defendant who fails to comply, by excluding relevant, proba-
tive evidence is a question raising Sixth Amendment issues which we have
no occasion to explore. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83 at n.14 (1970).
See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 471 at n. 1 (1973). But see United States v.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) (allowing preclusion of an investigator's testimony when
the defense refused to disclose his entire report to the prosecution at trial).
101 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (dictum).
' Note, Preclusion Sanction, supra note 103; Comment, Expansion of Discovery,
supra note 5.
,"I Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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cipant from testifying on behalf of the other. The record
showed that the statute excluded relevant and material testi-
mony,"10 and the Court struck it down as an "arbitrary rule that
prevent[s] whole categories of defense witnesses from testify-
ing on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unwor-
thy of belief.""' The Court explained that the rule was arbi-
trary because it did not "rationally" set apart "a group of per-
sons who are particularly likely to commit perjury,"" 2 and that
its effect, instead, was an unconstitutional exclusion of wit-
nesses who might testify truthfully.
Similarly, it has been argued that preclusion sanctions for
refusal to comply with pretrial discovery orders may arbitrarily
exclude relevant, material, and reliable evidence. The defen-
dant may refrain from disclosing names of witnesses for mo-
tives other than deception, "fear [of] intimidation or manipu-
lation of his witnesses by the government, either through
threats of prosecution or by offers of immunity or attractive
bargains," for example, or a "wish to protect either the privacy
of his witnesses or his relationship with them from the intensive
government investigation which would probably follow disclo-
sure." 
13
In view of Washington, a mandatory, complete ban on
presentation of defense witnesses would arguably violate the
sixth amendment and fundamental due process. While this is
true, statutes or rules which are only permjissive, stating that
the court "may" rather than "shall" preclude witnesses, do not
constitute an absolute ban of their testimony unlike the a priori
categorization in the Texas statute."' In essence, the Texas
statute had established an irrebuttable presumption resulting
in the exclusion of relevant, material, and potentially reliable
evidence. Permissive exclusion, on the other hand, allows the
defendant to rebut any presumption of untrustworthiness im-
plied by failure to disclose."' Before excluding testimony the
court should consider why the witnesses were not listed, how
,,o Id. at 23.
' Id. at 22.
112 Id.
"' Note, Preclusion Sanction, supra note 103, at 1350.
"' State v. Jones, 498 P.2d 65 (Kan. 1972); Simos v. Burke, 163 N.W.2d 177 (Wis.
1968).
115 Comment, Expansion of Discovery, supra note 5, at 30.
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their testimony would contribute to the merits of the case, and
whether any adverse effect to either the prosecution or the
defense would result from the ruling. '
The preclusion sanction is also justified as the only way to
insure compliance with the mandates of pretrial discovery. "It
is generally assumed that the [preclusion] sanction is essen-
tial if the notice-of-alibi rule is to have any practical signifi-
cance." '1" 7 This "punitive justification," however, would protect
the preclusion sanction from constitutional attack only if a
compelling state interest warranted the infringement on the
fundamental right to present a defense." 8 Presumably the state
interest in forcing compliance with disclosure orders is the
elimination of surprise at trial. When there is no demonstration
that the prosecution was in fact surprised by the proposed evi-
dence, then evidently there is no compelling state interest re-
quiring protection. Moreover, even if the interest is sufficiently
compelling to warrant protection, it must also be determined
that there are no less drastic means to realize that end."9 Sug-
gested alternatives which are less restrictive of the defendant's
sixth amendment right to present a defense include continu-
ance of the trial,'2 ° comment by the prosecution on defendant's
failure to comply, criminal sanctions," ' and contempt against
counsel.'22 Assuming that one of these alternatives would be
just as effective as preclusion in preserving the compelling state
interest, preclusion of the defense's heretofore nondisclosed
evidence may be unconstitutional.
,,8 State v. Miner, 258 A.2d 815, 825 (Vt. 1969).
, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, FED. R. Cram. P. 12.1, at 18 U.S.C.A.
241 (1975). See also Epstein, Advance Notice of Alibi, 55 J. CraM. L.C.&P.S. 29, 35
(1964).
"I Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the Prosecution-The Develop-
ing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REV. 437, 452 (1972); Note, Preclusion
Sanction, supra note 103, at 1353-56.
"I Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); School District v. Rodriquez, 411
U.S. 1, 51 (1972). See also Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional
Adjudication: An Analysis, A Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REv. 971
(1974); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
' Connery v. State, 499 P.2d 462 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1972); Okla. Stat. tit.
22, § 585 (1971); Note,.Preclusion Sanction, supra note 103, at 1357.
2I Note, Preclusion Sanction, supra note 103, at 1358-59.
"' Id.; Norton, Discovery in the Criminal Process, 61 J. Crm. L.C.&P.S. 11, 31-
35 (1970); Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1276,
1294 (1966).
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Nonetheless, the question remains whether the sixth
amendment right to present a defense prohibits preclusion
sanction which excludes relevant and material evidence in any
event. The United States Supreme Court touched on this issue
in United States v. Nobles.'1 In this case the lower court pre-
cluded the testimony of a defense investigator about a report
relating to statements made by key prosecution witnesses be-
cause defense counsel indicated that he would refuse to make
the investigator's report available to the prosecution at the end
of the investigator's testimony. The Supreme Court upheld this
action explaining that preclusion of the investigator's testi-
mony on the report did not deprive the defendant of his sixth
amendment rights since the trial court had not completely
barred the investigator's testimony. The Court justified the
exclusion stating: "The Sixth Amendment does not confer the
right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of
the adversarial system; one cannot invoke the Sixth Amend-
ment as a justification for presenting what might have been a
half-truth."''2 Despite this broad language it remains to be seen
whether the Court will extend Nobles to permit wholesale ex-
clusion of defense evidence because of failure to provide the
prosecution with pretrial discovery.
II. THE ABA STANDARDS AND PRESENT LAW
A. Discovery by the Prosecution: The ABA Standards and
Present Law
While original ABA standards did not require that defen-
ses or witnesses be disclosed to the prosecution,'2 the ABA
House of Delegates upon adoption of the standards added the
following provision:
Subject to constitutional limitations, the trial court may re-
quire that the prosecuting attorney be informed of the nature
of any defenses which defense counsel intends to use at trial
1 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
121 Id. at 241. This testimony would have been used for impeachment of prosecu-
tion witnesses, not for presentation of an affirmative defense.
"I ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at Commentary 43-46 (Tentative Draft, May
1969).
1976]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64
and the names and addresses of persons whom defense coun-
sel intends to call as witnesses in support thereof.' 6
The commentary accompanying this section recognizes that
this provision is "narrowly skirting certain constitutional limi-
tations which are not fully delineated," and explains that the
condition "subject to constitutional limitations" was inserted
as a precaution.'27 This standard has been proposed as a pat-
tern rule of court' 8 and has been adopted in substantially the
same form as a court rule in Illinois. 29
Rules in 23 states, in addition to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12.1, require notice of alibi;' Kentucky does not.
Federal Rule 12.1 is quite similar to the Florida notice of alibi
requirement upheld in Williams v. Florida;'3' the notice and
"I ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at Supp., Proposed Revisions at 3-6 (adopted
August 1970).
1' Id. at 4. This commentary was written after Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970).
'" P. WILSON, PATTERN RULES OF COURT AND CODE PROVISIONS § 7-2.3, at 126 (1976)
(prepared for Committee on Implementation of Standards for the Administration of
Justice of the Section of Criminal Justice of the American Bar Association)
[hereinafter cited as PATTERN RULES].
"I ILL. S. CT. RULE 413 (d) (Special Pamphlet, Oct. 4, 1971). The Illinois Supreme
Court has already adopted all of the other essential provisions of the ABA Standards
as well. ILL. S. CT. RULES 411-15. For a discussion of the Illinois rules from a prosecu-
torial viewpoint see Zagel & Carr, State Criminal Discovery and the New Illinois Rule,
1971 U. ILL. L.F. 557; from a judge's viewpoint see Strayhorn, Full Criminal Discovery
in Illinois: A Judge's Experience, 56 JUDICATURE 279 (1973); and for a critical view by
defense counsel see Doherty, Total Pretrial Disclosure to the State: A Requiem to the
Accusatorial System, 60 ILL. BAR J. 534 (1972); Comment, Constitutional Infirmities
of the Revised Illinois Rules of Criminal Discovery, 7 J. MARSHALL J. PaAC. & PROC.
364 (1974).
"I See ARiz. R. CRIM. P. 192G; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 12.1; FLA. R. CRmi. P. 1.200; ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, §114-14 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. §9-1639 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN.
§777.18 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. §22-3218 (Supp. 1970); ME. R. CraM. P. 16(b); MiCH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. §768.20,.21 (1968); MINN. STAT. §630.14 (1967); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. §95-1803(d) (1969); NEV. REV. STAT. §174.087 (1969); N.J. CT. R. 3:11-1; N.Y.
CODE CRIM. PROC. §250.20 (McKinney 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2945.58 (Page
1954); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §585 (1961); ORE. REV. STAT. §135.875 (1969); PA. R. Clum.
P. 312; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§23-37-5, -6 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. §77-22-17
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§6561-62 (1958); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §10,37.033
(Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. §971.23(8) (1971).
The scope of the notice and the sanctions for noncompliance vary significantly
from state to state. For an outline of the requirements of the above listed rules and
statutes see Zagel & Carr, State Criminal Discovery and the New Illinois Rules, 1971
U. ILL. L.F. 557 (Appendix A at 637-640).
"1, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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disclosure of witnesses is mandatory upon written demand by
the government. 3 The defense also has a reciprocal right to the
names and addresses of witnesses upon whom the government
intends to rely either "to establish the defendant's presence at
the scene of the alleged offense" or "to rebut testimony of any
of the defendant's alibi witnesses."'33 As such the rule appears
to be in accord with the due process requirement of reciprocity
established by Wardius v. Oregon.'34
Kentucky's practice is consistent with the federal rules in
requiring the giving of notice when the defendant intends to use
the defense of insanity. Neither the federal rule'35 nor the Ken-
tucky statute'35 require the names and addresses of witnesses
to be used to support that defense, but Federal Rule 12.2(b)
mandates disclosure of the defense's intention to make use of
expert testimony. These notice of insanity requirements, how-
ever, do not present the fifth amendment problems present
under the notice of alibi statutes. Simple notice of insanity has
been distinguished from the requirement of production of alibi
evidence and witnesses in that "transfer of notice does not
provide any factual information which the prosecution can use
against the defendant,""'3 and hence is not incriminating.
Rule 12.2, however, is arguably insufficient in that it re-
quires notice by the defense of intention to use expert testi-
mony but does not provide the defense with an opportunity to
discover what evidence the prosecution would rely upon to
rebut the insanity defense.' 31 In Wardius v. Oregon, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated that: "[I]n the absence of fair notice
that he would have an opportunity to discover the State's re-
In FED. R. CRM. P. 12.1(a). For a thorough discussion of the new federal rules see
Comment, Expansion of Discovery, supra note 5.
"' FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 (b).
I' 412 U.S. 470 (1973)(requiring disclosure by the government of names and ad-
dresses of witnesses whom it will use in its "refutation of the very pieces of evidence
which [the defendant] disclosed to the State") Id. at 476. See also Nakell, The Effect
of Due Process on Criminal Defense Discovery, 62 Ky. L.J. 58, 62-66 (1973) (the
commentator suggests that by disclosing a small amount of alibi evidence the defense
can discover practically the entire case of the prosecution).
I FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2.
" KRS § 504.050 (1975).
' Comment, Expansion of Discovery, supra note 5, at 32. See also Radford v.
Stewart, 320 F. Supp. 826, 829 (D. Mont. 1970); Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 312 A.2d
434 (Pa. 1973).
111 FED. R. CRIAM. P. 12.2(a).
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buttal witnesses, petitioner cannot be compelled to reveal his
alibi defense."' 39 Thus, under an extension of Wardius, Rule
12.2 may violate notions of fundamental fairness. 4 ' The draf-
ters of the Kentucky statute recognized the need for reciprocity
under Wardius and so provided that the prosecution must in-
form the defendant of "the names and addresses of the wit-
nesses the state proposes to offer in denial of the. . . defense,
along with any medical reports prepared by those witnesses"
on the defendant's mental condition;' this is true even though
the defendant is required to give only notice of the defense and
not names of witnesses.
Both the federal and Kentucky law also provide for a psy-
chiatric examination of the defendant by a court-appointed
doctor. The federal rule, however, leaves the ordering of such
an examination to the discretion of the court upon a motion by
the prosecution.4 2 The Kentucky statute requires the court to
order the examination once the defendant has given notice of
his defense.'
These court-ordered psychiatric examinations generally
present no fifth amendment problems so long as evidence ac-
quired during the examination is used to aid in determining
insanity and not guilt.'"4 Moreover, the Kentucky statute bet-
ter protects the defendant's interest than the federal rules in
that it allows the defendant's psychiatrist to witness and par-
ticipate in the examination by the state psychiatrist.'
Regarding other discovery by the prosecution, both the
federal and Kentucky rules provide that discovery by the
defense may be conditioned upon the defense's disclosure of
certain evidence to the prosecution.' The original proposed
amendment to the federal criminal discovery provisions would
,31 412 U.S. 470, 479 (1973).
11 Comment, Expansion of Discovery, supra note 5, at 31.
" KRS § 504.050(3)(1975)(Commentary).
"2 FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2 (c).
43 KRS § 504.050(2)(1975).
"I See KRS § 504.050 (1975) (Commentary) citing United States v. Pate, 409 F.2d
498 (7th Cir. 1969); State v. Ordog, 212 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1965); People v. Abdul Karim
AI-Kanani, 260 N.E.2d 496 (N.Y. 1970). See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966) and United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
,3 KRS § 504.050(2) (1975).
,, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A); Ky. R. CR. 7.24 (3).
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have granted "independent" discovery rights to the prosecu-
tion so that the prosecution would have been entitled to dis-
cover the defendant's evidence even without prior request for
discovery by the defense. 7 This approach was vigorously and
apparently effectively criticized' and rejected in favor of
"conditional" or "reciprocal" discovery. Thus, the prosecution
is not entitled to discovery unless the defense first requests
information.
Presumably this change was made in the belief that condi-
tional government discovery would minimize the risk that per-
mitting pretrial discovery by the prosecution would infringe
upon the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Since the defendant is triggering disclosure by
requesting evidence from the prosecution, he waives any fifth
amendment protections he may have.' It has been argued,
however, that the defendant's access to the prosecution's evi-
dence is being conditioned upon the waiver of the defendant's
fifth amendment privilege, and that this in effect penalizes the
defense for exercising a constitutional right."' In view of
Williams v. Florida"' and because disclosure is limited to evi-
dence intended to be introduced at trial as evidence in chief,
it is arguable that no fifth amendment privilege is being penal-
ized under the federal rules.
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 7.24(3) also allows
discovery of certain evidence that the defendant intends to
introduce at trial, but only after the defendant has been
granted discovery of the Commonwealth's tangible evidence.
" See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1974 Amendment, FED. R. CRIM.
P. 16, at 18 U.S.C.A. 370 (1975).
I4R Note, Prosecutorial Discovery, supra note 65.
"'See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1974 Amendment, FED. R. Cumi.
P. 16, at 18 U.S.C.A. 370 (1975). See also Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 HAST. L.J.
865 (1968); Wilder, Prosecution Discovery and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 6 AM. CR. L.Q. 3 (1967).
"I See generally United'States v. Fratello, 44 F.R.D. 444 (1968); ABA STANDARDS,
DiscovEty, supra note 4, at Commentary 43-46; C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTiCE AND
PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 256 (1969, Supp. 1971); Black, Statements on Amendments
to Rules of Criminal Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 272 (1966); Douglas, Statements on
Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 277 (1966); Smith & Mc-
Collom, Counterdiscovery in Criminal Cases: Fifth Amendment Privileges Abridged,
54 A.B.A.J. 256 (1968); Note, Criminal Law; Constitutionality of Conditional Mutual
Discovery Under Federal Rule 16, 19 OKLA. L. REv. 417 (1966).
151 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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The constitutionality of this provision under the Kentucky
Constitution's privilege against self-incrimination'5 2 has not
been challenged. It should be noted, however, that this rule
gives the Commonwealth the right to inspect, copy, or photo-
graph "statements" which the defendant intends to introduce
at trial without regard to whether the evidence will be used as
evidence in chief or for impeachment. Kentucky Criminal Rule
7.24(2), on the other hand, specifically precludes the defense
from inspecting statements made by witnesses to agents or
officers of the Commonwealth. Assuming Wardius v. Oregon"3
requires "tit-for-tat" reciprocity, this section may be unconsti-
tutional as violative of the requirements of due process and
fundamental fairness.54
Furthermore, although recently refusing to apply fifth
amendment protections to statements of third parties obtained
by a defense investigator,' 5 the Supreme Court held that such
statements are protected by the work product doctrine.'
Statements made by witnesses to the defense or prosecution
are explicitly protected from disclosure by Federal Rule 16(a)
and (b)(2).
Another important difference between the federal and
Kentucky rules of discovery is that the federal rules require
disclosure to the prosecution once the defendant has received
discovery under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) or (D), while the Kentucky
rules merely permit the conditioning of disclosure to the de-
152 KY. CONST. § 11 (state-protected privilege against self-incrimination).
'= 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
"' D. MURRELL, KENTUCKY CRIMINAL PRACTICE 87 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
MURRELL].
'1 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). The Court reasoned that the fifth
amendment privilege is an "intimate and personal one" and the fact that the defense
investigator had elicited the statements on behalf of the defendant did not "convert"
them into the defendants' personal communications. Thus, the Court concluded,
"[tihe Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, being per-
sonal to the defendant, does not extend to the testimony or statements of third parties
called as witnesses at trial." Id. at 234.
'" The defense counsel wanted to impeach the credibility of key prosecution wit-
nesses through the testimony of the defense investigator based on statements obtained
by him from those witnesses. The trial court conditioned the investigator's testimony
upon disclosure of the investigator's full report of his conversations with the prosecu-
tion witnesses. Defense counsel refused to make the disclosure. The Court stated that
while the report was protected by the work product doctrine the privilege was waived
by defense counsel's election to present the investigator as a witness. Id. at 238-40.
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fense with the requirement of reciprocal disclosure to the prose-
cution.'57 Thus, a Kentucky court is free to exercise its com-
plete discretion in making such a demand.
Finally, in the realm of prosecutorial discovery, the ABA
standards also codified recent court decisions which make the
"person" of the defendant subject to state investigatory proce-
dures."8 Pursuant to those decisions the accused must appear
in line-ups;' 59 provide voice exemplars,' ° fingerprints and
handwriting samples;' 6 ' and allow reasonable physical or medi-
cal examinations.' 2 These investigatory procedures have gener-
ally been allowed in federal as well as Kentucky courts.
B. Discovery by the Defense
The ABA Standards for Criminal Discovery also propose
liberal provisions for pretrial discovery by the defense. In defin-
ing the scope of discovery, section 1.2 states that "discovery
. . . should be as full and free as possible .... 11113 The stan-
dards place responsibility for expeditious discovery on counsel
as well as the court.' 64
The standards require that the prosecutor not only disclose
exculpatory material but also that he do so before trial.'65 In
addition, the prosecutor must disclose any statements of the
accused, his codefendant, or prospective witnesses, including
testimony before the grand jury; the names and addresses of
witnesses whom he intends to call at trial; the reports, state-
ments and findings of any experts; tangible evidence to be used
at trial; and witnesses' criminal records. 6' Under the stan-
dards, the defendant must also be notified when the prosecutor
has relevant material or information provided by an informant
1- Ky. R. CR. 7.24(3). Note use of the word "may."
'' ABA STANDARDS, DIscovERY, supra note 4, at § 3.1.
's, Cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
,' United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); cf. KRS § 422.120.
' Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
11 Scbmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
' ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY, supra note 4.
I Id. § 1.4.
11 ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY, supra note 4, at § 2.1(c). See also the discussion
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), infra notes 252 to 257 and accompanying
text.
I, Id. § 2.1(a).
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or relevant grand jury testimony which has not been tran-
scribed, and he is entitled to notification that there has been
electronic surveillance of conversations to which he was a party
or which occurred on the defendant's premises. 17
The defendant, however, will receive information concern-
ing specified searches and seizures only upon request. A request
is also necessary to obtain copies of the accused's own state-
ments and the relationship, if any, of specified persons to the
prosecuting authority.'68 In addition, the court at its discretion
may order the disclosure of other information upon a showing
of materiality. '69
In this way, the standards remedy some of the inequities
in the present criminal discovery system by granting the ac-
cused access to evidence obtained through grand juries, supe-
rior scientific facilities, more efficient investigative procedures
and accessibility to greater manpower. Moreover, the stan-
dards bar either party from hindering the investigative work of
the other.' This should aid defendants, who often encounter
potential witnesses already warned by the police not to talk."1
Disclosures under these standards, however, are subject to
certain limitations. If the trial court finds that there is any
substantial risk to any person of physical harm, economic re-
prisals, bribery or even "unnecessary annoyance or embarass-
ment," and that such risk outweighs any benefits to the
defense, the court may deny disclosure.7 2 Furthermore, section
4.4, applicable to both the defense and prosecution, provides
for protective orders permitting specified disclosures to be re-
stricted or deferred. The material, however, must be disclosed
in time to permit counsel to make use of it. These protections
should allay fears of witness intimidation and harassment.
Areas of information which are not subject to disclosure by
" Id. § 2.1(b).
IM Id. § 2.3.
M Id. § 2.5(a). See Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (court
prohibited counsel for either side from advising witnesses not to discuss the case with
the other parties).
110 ABA STANDARDS, DiscovERY, supra note 4, at § 4.1.
17' Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1182-83 (1960).
72 ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY, supra note 4, at § 2.5(6).
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the prosecution are work product, informants' identity where
failure to disclose will not infringe upon the accused's constitu-
tional rights, and information involving a "substantial risk of
grave prejudice to national security.1' 73 Protection of work
product, of course, is not a new concept, and civil cases dealing
with this issue offer some guidance.174 Moreover, the work prod-
uct doctrine has recently been extended to criminal cases by
the U.S. Supreme Court.175 Section 2.6(2) limits the "work
product" to reports or memoranda which reflect the "opinions,
theories or conclusions of the prosecuting attorney or members
of his legal staff." This does not include theories or conclusions
of lab technicians or other experts discoverable under section
2.1(a)(iv).176
The prohibition against disclosure of informant's identity
is in line with Supreme Court decisions holding that such dis-
closure is necessary only when the informant's testimony will
be given at trial.'7 While there are few cases involving prohibi-
tion of disclosures endangering national security, the ABA
committee felt provision should be made for the rare case.
1 78
Under present Kentucky law, pretrial defense discovery in
criminal cases is not so broad as the ABA standardsY.17 Neither
the Kentucky nor the federal rules provide for pretrial disclo-
sure of names, addresses, or statements of witnesses whom the
prosecution intends to call at trial. In fact, Kentucky Criminal
Rule 7.24(2) specifically prohibits the defendant from pretrial
discovery'" of witnesses' statements to the Commonwealth or
, Id. § 2.6.
'7, Cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
'7' United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
'7, ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY, supra note 4, at 91.
'7 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53
(1957).
" ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY, supra note 4, at 93.
'7' For a skeletal comparison of Kentucky discovery law and the ABA Standards
see Comparative Analysis of American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice
with Kentucky Law, Rules and Legal Practice sponsored by the Kentucky Judicial
Conference (March 1974).
"I This note focuses on pretrial criminal discovery, that is, discovery from arraign-
ment to the impaneling of the jury, and does not deal with discovery during trial. It
should be noted, however, that Kentucky, as do most states, provides that after a
prosecution witness has testified on direct examination, the defendant may move to
examine any documented or recorded statement of the witness which the Common-
wealth possesses. Ky. R. CR. 7.26. See also Roach v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 154
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its investigators.'"' Nonetheless, all exculpatory settlements are
still subject to disclosure."2 Kentucky Criminal Rule 6.08 does
require that the Commonwealth endorse the names of all grand
jury witnesses on the indictment. A federal statute provides for
a similar endorsement but only in capital cases.'1 Such en-
dorsement, however, is of little help as a discovery tool in Ken-
tucky since the Commonwealth is not required to reveal the
source of the information on which the grand jury witness
based his testimony.' 4 Because hearsay is admissible in grand
jury proceedings," 5 the Commonwealth can call before the
grand jury a police officer to reiterate statements made to him
by other witnesses whose identity will remain unknown to the
defense. Furthermore, the Commonwealth at trial is not lim-
ited to calling only those who testified before the grand jury,'
nor is it required to produce all the witnesses who appeared
before the grand jury.8 '
Kentucky law is in accordance with the ABA standards in
providing for a government privilege to withhold an inform-
(Ky. 1974); Lynch v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 263 (Ky. 1971). However, the Ken-
tucky high court has held that failure to require production of police reports not
purporting to contain substantially verbatim statements of the witness was not reversi-
ble error. Pankey v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d 513, 520 (Ky. 1972). Ky. R. CR. 7.26
has been referred to by the then Kentucky Court of Appeals as "our counterpart of
the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500." Lynch v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Ky.
1971).
IS See also Robinson v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 481, 482 (Ky. 1973); Davis
v. Commonwealth, 463 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1970).
'" Pankey v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d 513 (Ky. 1972). The defendants moved
for disclosure of the names of all witnesses who failed to identify appellants as partici-
pants in crimes and any statements of such witnesses with regard to descriptions of
participants and other details of crimes as observed by the witnesses. The Court of
Appeals held there was no error in nondisclosure since there was no showing that the
Commonwealth had such knowledge. The Court added, however: "A different matter
would be involved if appellants were able to show that they did not have available the
testimony of a witness who would have exonerated them because the prosecution
knowingly suppressed the name of the witness." Id. at 520.
Ms 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1970).
18 Pankey v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d 513 (Ky. 1972) (Ky. R. Ca. 6.08 requires
endorsement of the names of persons upon whose statements the information is based
only when prosecution is by information).
t Ky. R. CR. 5.10. See also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1957).
t Harris v. Commonwealth, 315 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1958); Watts v. Common-
wealth, 213 S.W.2d 795 (Ky. 1948); Long v. Commonwealth, 155 S.W.2d 246 (Ky.
1941).
I Harris v. Commonwealth, 315 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1958).
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ant's identity except where the constitutional rights of the ac-
cused will be adversely affected. ' In addressing this issue, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals stated in Burks v.
Commonwealth'5' that: "The significant point is that when an
informer participates in or places himself in the position of
observing a criminal transaction he ceases to be merely a
source of information and becomes a witness." The Court went
on to explain that, while it would generally recognize the state's
need to maintain the anonymity of its sources of information,
the Court knew of "no valid principle under which the identity
of a known witness may be concealed from adversary parties
in any kind of a judicial proceeding, criminal or civil." 9' In
spite of this broad language, the Kentucky Court has not ex-
tended disclosure of the name of a material witness in a crimi-
nal case beyond the informant situation. 9' Moreover, the Ken-
tucky Court has not required that this disclosure be made be-
fore trial. Such a requirement, however, would be in line with
the ABA standards'9 - and the leading U.S. Supreme Court
opinion on disclosure of informants, Roviaro v. United
States,"' upon which the Kentucky Court relied in Burks.
Upon request by the defendant, disclosure of his state-
ments is mandatory under the federal rules'94 and discretionary
with the court under Kentucky rules.' 5 In Riebesehl v.
Commonwealth,"' the Court of Appeals, now the Supreme
Court of Kentucky, held that nonproduction of a defendant's
confession before trial did not constitute reversible error. In so
"3 ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY, supra note 4, at § 2.6(b); Jenkins v. Holbert, 485
S.W.2d 238 (Ky. 1972); Buchenburger v. Commonwealth, 482 S.W.2d 747 (Ky. 1972);
Thompson v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. 1971); Berkshire v. Common-
wealth, 471 S.W.2d 695 (Ky. 1971).
"3 471 S.W.2d 298, 300-01 (Ky. 1971).
" Id. at 300.
" See Dryden v. Commonwealth, Memorandum Opinion (75-360, June 1976).
But see MURRELL, supra note 154, at 81.
,,2 ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY, supra note 4, at § 2.1(a)(i).
"= 353 U.S. 53 (1957) in which the Court stated: "[W]e think that the court erred
also in denying, prior to trial, petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, insofar as it
requested John Doe's [the informant's] identity and address." (emphasis added). Id.
at 64.
'"FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A).
"3 Ky. R. CR. 7.24(1)(a). See also Robinson v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 481,
482 (Ky. 1973).
1- 434 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Ky. 1968).
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holding, however, the Court emphasized that the jury in
RiebesehI was admonished to disregard the defendant's state-
ments as testified to by a police officer at trial. In a more recent
case, the Court held that it did not constitute error for the
prosecutor to introduce the accused's tape recorded conversa-
tions which had not been produced before trial pursuant to a
pretrial discovery order under Kentucky Criminal Rule 7.24.'11
Although Federal Rule 16(a) allows a defendant to dis-
cover his own statements in the possession of the government,
the Jencks Act' g5 prohibits the disclosure of statements by pro-
spective witnesses. In United States v. Feinberg'99 the court
had to decide whether the portion of a government witness's
statement, which contained a statement by the defendant, had
to be disclosed under 16(a). The circuit court ruled that the
defendant's statements could not be discovered in view of the
Jencks Act. In some instances, therefore, the Jencks Act will
reduce the discovery permitted under Rule 16.200
In addition, neither the federal nor Kentucky rules provide
for discovery of a statement by a codefendant. Nor does either
set of rules provide for disclosure of prior criminal convictions
of prosecution witnesses; the federal rules do require, however,
disclosures of a codefendant's prior record."0 ' This puts the de-
fendant at a decided disadvantage since he does not have the
access of the prosecution to criminal records in other jurisdic-
tions. This is especially crucial in Kentucky since prior convic-
tions can be used to impeach witnesses if such convictions are
for crimes indicative of dishonesty."' The defense is thus, in
some cases, denied an opportunity to cross-examine a prosecu-
tion witness effectively.
Kentucky also provides that if grand jury testimony is
117 Deskins v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. 1974). It should be recognized,
however, that the case involved an unusual fact situation. The conversations were
between the defendant and a person who had pilfered portions of the Commonwealth's
case file for the defendant. Both the defendant and his attorney had opportunity to
hear the tapes out of the presence of the jury before they were introduced as evidence.
,,8 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
," 502 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1974). See also Comment, Criminal Discovery, 51 Cm.-
KENT L. REv. 633 (1975).
10 See Comment, Expansion of Discovery, supra note 5, at 36.
in FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(B).
112 Cotton v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1970).
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transcribed, a copy must be given to the defendant." 3 The deci-
sion to transcribe such proceedings, however, is entirely within
the discretion of the prosecution." 4 Moreover, the defendant
does not have a right to elect to have the grand jury testimony
transcribed.05
Disclosure of documents, tangible objects, and reports of
examinations or tests is also mandatory upon the defense's
request under Federal Rule 16(a) (1) (C) and (D) and discretion-
ary under Kentucky Criminal Rule 7.24(1) and (2).01 The fed-
eral rule is broader than the Kentucky rule as Federal Rule 16
allows discovery not only of evidence material to the defense's
preparation, but also of any evidence intended for use by the
prosecution at trial. Kentucky Criminal Rule 7.24(2), on the
other hand, limits discovery of tangible evidence to that which
is "material" to the preparation of the defense. Furthermore,
the Kentucky high court has given "materiality" a very narrow
interpretation in that the evidence sought by the defendant
must be exculpatory. In Pankey v. Commonwealth,n7 the de-
fendant moved to discover photographs used in a line-up. The
defendant argued that the photographs could be used to im-
peach witnesses who had not been able to identify him in the
line-up. The lower court's denial of the defendant's motion was
upheld on appeal on the basis that even if the defendant could
have shown through use of the photos that there had been a
failure to identify, this was "not necessarily evidence of inno-
cence"0 and presumably not material to the defense. Given
2M Ky. R. CR. 5.16(2).
20, Davis v. Commonwealth, 463 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1970); Parker v. Common-
wealth, 461 S.W.2d 86 (Ky. 1970); Amburgey v. Commonwealth, 415 S.W.2d 103 (Ky.
1967); White v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1965).
= Lawless v. Commonwealth, 539 S.W.2d 101 (Ky. 1976).
20 For discovery of documents under Kentucky rules see Ky. R. CR. 7.08. In
addition, KRS § 422.120(2) requires reasonable notice of intention to introduce hand-
writing samples in cases where the handwriting is actually in dispute. It further allows
the other side reasonable opportunity to inspect the samples before trial. But see
Francis v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Ky. 1971) in which the Court ex-
plained that the purpose of notice is to afford a defendant the opportunity to question
the genuineness of samples. Therefore, the notice requirement is not applicable where
samples are admitted to be genuine.
m 485 S.W.2d 513 (Ky. 1972). This interpretation of "materiality" appears to be
in line with the latest United States Supreme Court opinion defining "materiality."
United States v. Agurs, - U.S. , 95 S.Ct. 2392 (1976).
2U, Id. at 520. See also MURRELL, supra note 154, at 88.
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this interpretation, the defendant could be denied documents,
reports, or other tangible evidence which, although not excul-
patory per se, may lead to exculpatory evidence. Pankey, none-
theless, concerned tangible evidence which was not subse-
quently introduced at trial; if the evidence sought had been
subsequently introduced, even though not exculpatory, the
Court might have ordered disclosure on the basis of fairness.
In any case, the discretionary language of the rule gives the
trial judge much leeway in ordering prosecutorial disclosure.
In addition to materiality, Kentucky Criminal Rule
7.24(2) also requires that the material sought by the defense
must be in the actual possession of the Commonwealth"'9 and
that the request be reasonable. 210 The Kentucky Supreme
Court will not allow the defendant "free rein to rummage at
will through the prosecution's file to discover whether anything
therein may be of value, '2 1' but neither will the Court allow "a
cat and mouse game whereby the Commonwealth is permitted
to withhold important information requested by the ac-
cused." 212
Kentucky Criminal Rule 7.24(1) allows the defendant to
inspect "the results of mental and physical examinations and
of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the
particular case" and "known by the attorney for Common-
wealth to be in the possession, custody or control of the Com-
monwealth . . . ." This rule does not require a showing of
materiality, however. Thus, in James v. Commonwealth,"3 a
case involving illegal narcotic sales, the Court held that the
Commonwealth's failure to provide the defense with an oppor-
tunity to inspect drug samples and chemists' reports submitted
to the police and subsequently introduced at trial was reversi-
ble error. The court at its discretion, however, can refuse to
order disclosure of scientific reports even though they are in the
possession of the Commonwealth if they are not exculpatory
per se and are not intended for introduction at trial.14
201 Stone v. Commonwealth, 418 S.W.2d 646 (Ky. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1010 (1968).
20 Ky. R. CR. 7.24(1)(b); Pankey v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d 513 (Ky. 1972).
211 Pankey v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d 513, 521 (Ky. 1972).
212 James v. Commonwealth, 482 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ky. 1972).
213 Id.
21, Kentucky defense counsel should also be cognizant of Barclay v. Common-
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In consideration of nondisclosure of work product, Ken-
tucky Criminal Rule 7.24(2) goes beyond the work product pro-
tection contemplated by the ABA standards; it prevents
pretrial discovery of all reports and memoranda of officers in-
cluding reports of any statements made to officers by wit-
nesses. Once an officer testifies at trial, however, the defense
is entitled to see investigative reports upon which the officer
relied.2 15
C. Sanctions for Noncompliance
The ABA Advisory Committee declined to provide specific
sanctions for violations of proposed discovery rules; instead, it
left the question of remedies to the trial court, giving it power
to enter whatever order it deems just under the circumstances.
The standards present only three specific suggestions for deal-
ing with a party who fails to comply with a discovery rule or
order: (1) Order the party to permit discovery of the informa-
tion not previously disclosed, (2) grant a continuance, or (3)
take appropriate action against counsel for willful violation of
a discovery rule or order.218
A virtually identical wide-open approach is taken in Fed-
eral Rule 16(d)(2) and Kentucky Civil Rule 7.24(9) which deal
with discovery of documents, statements, and tangible objects.
These rules were drafted in the belief that such discretion will
free the court "to consider the reasons why disclosure was not
made, the extent of the prejudice, if any, to the opposing party,
the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance,
and any other relevant circumstances. '217
These rules, however, differ from ABA standard 4.7 in one
major respect. Both rules specifically allow a party to be pro-
wealth, 499 S.W.2d 283 (Ky. 1973), in which the Commonwealth had failed to produce
tests as ordered by the trial court pursuant to Ky. R. CR. 7.24. Defense counsel when
the case was called for trial, however, answered, "Ready." The Court of Appeals held
that defense could not appeal on the basis of the prosecutor's failure to disclose since
"[i]f there was non-compliance with the order to furnish information the response
that Barclay was ready for trial was a waiver." Id. at 285.
215 LeGrande v. Commonwealth, 494 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1973); Maynard v. Com-
monwealth, 497 S.W.2d 567 (Ky. 1973).
21, ABA STANDARDs, DiscovERY, supra note 4, at § 4.7. See KRS § 432 (contempt).
217 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, FED. R. CRim. P. 16, at 18 U.S.C.A.
364 (1975).
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hibited from introducing tangible evidence which has not been
previously disclosed. This provision, however, was intention-
ally omitted by the ABA committee"1 8 because of the constitu-
tional difficulties in using such a sanction against the accused
already discussed. Moreover, the committee wanted to insure
that sanctions for procedural noncompliance would affect the
evidence at trial and merits of the case as little as possible,
"since these standards are designed to implement, not to
impede, fair and speedy determination of cases."218
As was noted earlier, neither the United States Supreme
Court nor the Kentucky Supreme Court has ruled on the con-
stitutionality of a similar sanction for failure to provide pretrial
disclosure. Even though preclusion may survive constitutional
attack because it is discretionary rather than mandatory,"'
application of the provision to a specific case may constitute
reversible error as an infringement on the accused's sixth and
fourteenth amendment rights. This would be true if the trial
court precluded evidence without finding actual and substan-
tial surprise on the part of the prosecution or without examin-
ing alternatives other than exclusion to alleviate that sur-
prise.22'
The federal rules, unlike the Kentucky rules, further per-
mit the court to exclude testimony of undisclosed alibi
witnesses. Such exclusion of witnesses, as has already been
discussed, may violate the accused's right to compulsory pro-
cess and his right to present a defense. The federal rule never
limits the right of the defendant to testify in his own behalf.
Under the sanctions of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
§ 504.050 (1) and Federal Rule 12.2(a), the defense of insanity
is absolutely barred upon failure of the defendant to give notice
of his intent to present such a defense. This absolute sanction
is arguably in conflict with the Washington 222 case which guar-
antees the right to present such a defense under the sixth
amendment.23 The federal rules, unlike Kentucky's, also per-
21S But see Pattern Rules, supra note 128, at § 7-3.7.
213 ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY, supra note 4, Commentary at 108.
21 See text accompanying notes 114 to 116 supra.
"I Comment, Expansion of Discovery, supra note 5, at 43.
22 FED. R. C1UM. P. 12.1(d). This rule in no event limits the right of the defendant
to testify in his own behalf.
222 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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mit exclusion of the defense's expert testimony24 if he fails to
inform the prosecution that he intends to use an expert.12s
IV. STRATAGEMS FOR PRETRIAL DIsCOVERY UNDER
KENTUCKY LAW
Because criminal pretrial discovery rules are generally lim-
ited,2M defense attorneys use other devices to gather informa-
tion before trial-devices which were not created specifically
for discovery. 2  One of the best discovery opportunities for the
defense before trial is the preliminary hearing.228 At the hearing
the prosecutor must establish a prima facie case against the
defendant.28 This gives the defense an opportunity to learn the
prosecution's theory of the case and to cross-examine its wit-
nesses.211 Moreover, in Kentucky, once granted a preliminary
hearing the defendant is entitled to have a transcript or min-
utes of the hearing,231 which can be used at trial for impeach-
ment purposes. Of course, the defense is not obligated to pro-
duce any witnesses or present any defense at this time. The
importance of this discovery aspect of the preliminary hearing
m Comment, Expansion of Discovery, supra note 5, at 31.
2M5 FED. R. CRm. P. 12.2(b). This exclusion is limited to expert witnesses; it does
not apply to laymen. FED. R. CRIn. P. 12.2(d).
m The scope of discovery rules varies significantly from state to state. See Zagel
& Carr, State Criminal Discovery, supra note 30. For an examination of some of those
states' experiences in criminal discovery see Gaynor, Defendant's Right of Discovery
in Criminal Cases, 20 CLEVE. ST. L. REv. 31 (1971) (discussion of criminal discovery
in Ohio); Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J. 732
(1967); Roether, Criminal Discovery in Michigan: The Pursuit of Justice, 50 J. URBAN
L. 751 (1973); Shatz, California Criminal Discovery: Eliminating Anachronistic Limi-
tations Imposed on the Defendant, 9 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 259 (1974); Tessner,
Discovery in Texas Criminal Cases, 28 Tax. B.J. 855 (1965); Note, Criminal Discovery-
Comparison of Federal Discovery and the ABA Standards with the New Statutory
Provisions in Wisconsin, 1971 Wisc. L. REV. 614; Comment, Criminal Discovery in
Louisiana, 42 TuL. L. REv. 620 (1968); Comment, Criminal Discovery, A Proposal for
Rules in Oklahoma, 5 TULSA L.J. 193 (1968); Comment, Pre-trial Discovery in Criminal
Cases, 17 Wyo. L.J. 192 (1963) (discussing criminal discovery in Wyoming).
2" See generally MURRELL, supra note 132, at 74-89; A. MoENssENs & R. MosEs,
F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 29-58 (1973).
"I But see Pankey v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d 513, 518 (Ky. 1972) (the prelim-
inary hearing is not a discovery device).
"I1 See generally Note, The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal
Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L.J. 771 (1974).
2 Ky. R. CR. 3.10(2).
"' Ky. R. CR. 3.16.
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was, in fact, one reason the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that
such a hearing is a "critical stage" requiring the presence of
counsel.
2 32
The significance of the preliminary hearing as a discovery
device, however, can be overestimated. Because the prosecutor
is not required to reveal all his evidence, he tends to put on as
few witnesses as possible. 233 Furthermore, the Kentucky Court
has held that once a defendant is indicted, he is no longer
entitled to a preliminary hearing and has no right to demand
one.234 Thus, the prosecution can avoid the preliminary hearing
entirely by direct submission of the case to the grand jury.
Hearings on motions to set or reduce the amount of bail
have also been used by defense attorneys in Kentucky to gather
pretrial information. The usefulness of this device was under-
scored by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, now the Supreme
Court of Kentucky, in Kuhnle v. Kassulke.3 In this case the
Court ruled that reversible error was committed in prohibiting
the defendant from calling the chief prosecution witness, the
victim, at the bail hearing. This decision was based on a rule
which required a court to consider, inter alia, "the nature and
circumstances of the offense charged" and "the weight of evi-
dence against the defendant" 236 in determining the amount of
bail, a determination which, the defendant argued, required
the prosecuting witness's testimony. Since Kuhnle was de-
213 [Tihe skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer
can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the
State's witnesses at the trial . . . . [Tirained counsel can more effectively
discover the case the State has against his client and make possible the
preparation of a proper defense to meet that case at the trial. Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
' E. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. KIMBALL, M. BELLI, H. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL
JusTIcE ADMINISTRATION 526-27 (1969).
2 In Caine v. Commonwealth, 491 S.W.2d 824 (Ky. 1973), the preliminary hear-
ing was continued on a motion of the Commonwealth and in the interim the prosecu-
tion obtained an indictment against the defendant. The Court of Appeals held that
failure to hold a preliminary hearing at that point did not deny defendant any of his
constitutional rights. See also Blackmore v. Commonwealth, 497 S.W.2d 231, 235 (Ky.
1973); Pankey v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d 513, 518 (Ky. 1972); Jenkins v. Com-
monwealth, 477 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Ky. 1972); Maggard v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d
893, 894 (Ky. 1965).
489 S.W.2d 833 (Ky. 1973).
= Ky. R. CR. 4.06, superseded by amendments of June 21, 1976. See text accom-
panying note 237 infra.
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cided, however, this rule has been changed pursuant to the
recent reform of Kentucky's bail bond system.1 Nevertheless,
the rules still require that the amount of bail be "commensur-
ate with the nature of the offense charged." ' Thus, the new
rule appears to continue to support the rationale of Kuhne. 2 9
Although a bill of particulars24 0 is not to be used for discov-
ery of evidence, it must be granted "to provide information
fairly necessary to enable the accused to understand and pre-
pare his defense against the charges without prejudicial sur-
prise upon trial."2 1 The bill of particulars becomes even more
important with the introduction of the abbreviated indictment
in Kentucky, an indictment which only informs the defendant
of the nature of the charge and does not detail the essential
factual elements.2 2 The bill of particulars complements the
indictment, and together they need only meet the standard for
a constitutionally adequate indictment.2 3 The bill must inform
the defendant of the charge's basic facts and must be more
2 3 KRS § 431.525(l)(c)(Supp. 1970).
21 Ky. R. CR. 4.16 (amended by Supreme Court order issued June 21, 1976); this
rule issued pursuant to KRS § 431.525(1)(c)(Supp. 1976).
"I Kubnle v. Kassulke, 489 S.W.2d 833 (Ky. 1973).
214 Ky. R. CR. 6.22. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(f); Kampfe, supra note 12,
which discussed the uses of federal bill of particulars.
242 Brown v. Commonwealth, 378 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Ky. 1964). See also Russell v.
Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. 1973); James v. Commonwealth, 482
S.W.2d 92,93 (Ky. 1972); Finch v. Commonwealth, 419 S.W.2d 146, 147-48 (Ky. 1967).
242 Ky. R. CR. 6.10. The rationale upon which the concept of the shortened indict-
ment rests is stated in Finch v. Commonwealth, 419 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1967):
The theory of the new rules of criminal procedure is that if the defendant
needs information concerning the details of the charge against him to enable
him to prepare his defense he should be supplied them through a requested
bill of particulars, rather than that a requirement be made that every indict-
ment set forth all details of the charge. Id. at 147.
21 The standard for a constitutionally adequate indictment was defined in United
States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953). Here the Supreme Court, quoting prior
cases said:
The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could have
been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the elements
of the offense intended to be charged, 'and sufficiently apprises the defen-
dant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other proceedings
are taken against him for a similar offense, whether the record shows with
accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.'
Cochran and Sayre v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 290; Rosen v. United
States, 161 U.S. 29, 34. Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 431. Cf.
United States v. Anderson, 447 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1971); E. CoawiN, THE
CONSTITroN AND WHAT IT MEANs TODAY 352-53 (1973 ed.).
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than "cursory. . .in purported obedience to the court's order
requiring that the bill be supplied."'2 "1 In reality this discovery
tool is quite limited and generally reveals only the bare charges
against the defendant.245 In addition, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals has specifically held that "particulars should not be
required when the motion appears to be merely an exploratory
maneuver or when the accused apparently has knowledge of the
facts or where the means of obtaining the facts are just as
accessible to him as to the prosecution." 2
There are various other pretrial motions raising defenses
or objections which may require hearings resulting in discovery
of the prosecution's evidence.27 These include motions to sup-
press evidence as fruits of an illegal search or arrest, thus plac-
ing a burden on the prosecution to demonstrate probable cause
for the search or arrest, 248 motions to suppress illegally obtained
confessions, motions to dismiss, motions to "reveal the deal"
between the prosecution and codefendants, 249 and motions
challenging a witness's identification of the defendant. Hear-
ings on motions require a factual determination and sometimes
allow the defense an opportunity to cross-examine prosecution
witnesses.2 0 But in making such motions the defendant must
show support for his allegations. 251 Moreover, the drawbacks of
using these motions for discovery are obvious. Because they
were not developed for this purpose, their use as discovery de-
vices is cumbersome, and multiple motions further clog already
crowded trial dockets causing needless delay. What is needed
is the development of discovery rules made solely for that pur-
pose. This would meet the defendant's discovery needs more
efficiently.
Both the federal and Kentucky rules also provide for open-
ended pretrial conferences to "consider such matters as will
244 Davis v. Commonwealth, 464 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Ky. 1970).
245 See Yankwich, Concealment or Revealment?, 3 FRD 209, 210 (1944).
244 Deskins v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Ky. 1974) citing Harris v.
Commonwealth, 285 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Ky. 1956).
24 Ky. R. CR. 8.16 through 8.22. MURRELL, supra note 154, at 84.
214 Freeman v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.2d 575 (Ky. 1967). See also United States
v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
211 See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
Shull v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Ky. 1971).
25: Lumpkins v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.2d 535 (Ky. 1968).
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promote a fair and expeditious trial. ' 22 Although the potential
of these conferences as independent sources of discovery has
not been developed, it has been suggested that they afford the
court an opportunity to consider such matters as whether the
names of government witnesses should be disclosed prior to
trial and whether witnesses' statements should be mutually
inspected.23
Another avenue for discovery, although it is quite limited,
was established by the United States Supreme Court in Brady
v. Maryland.- In Brady, the Court held that due process re-
quired the government to disclose upon a request for specifics
by the defense, any evidence "favorable to an accused . . .
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
'255
The Brady requirement of prosecutorial disclosure has signifi-
cant limitations with regard to pretrial discovery, however.
First, Brady does not mandate disclosure before trial, although
it does require that the material be disclosed at such time or
under such conditions as will enable the defense to make use
of the evidence. 56 Second, even if there is a specific request, the
prosecution initially decides the "materiality" of the evidence,
leaving a great deal to prosecutorial discretion.2 7 There are,
212 FED. R. CRMI. P. 17.1; Ky. R. Ca. 9.08.
2- Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1276,
1279-99 (1966).
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
215 Id. at 87. See also Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Giles v. Maryland,
386 U.S. 66 (1967); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213
(1942) (pre-Brady case in which the Court held that the prosecutor could not suppress
evidence favorable to the accused); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (pre-Brady
case holding that a prosecutor must correct the testimony of witness even though such
testimony only bears on the credibility of another witness); Arthur v. Commonwealth,
307 S.W.2d 182 (Ky. 1957).
- Clay v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Ky. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
943 (1970). See also Davis v. Commonwealth, 463 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1970).
2"1 ABA STANDARDS, DiscovERY, Commentary at 73 (Approved Draft, 1970); Tray-
nor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 228, 242, at n.
77 (1964). See also Cannon, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 516 (1969);
Note, Implementing Brady v. Maryland: An Argument for a Pretrial Open File Policy,
43 U. CiN. L. Rav. 889 (1974); Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal
Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964); Comment, Brady v. Maryland and
the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U. CHi. L. REV. 112 (1972).
At least one state court has stated that the prosecutor should at least disclose the
exculpatory material to the trial judge when there is doubt as to its nature. State v.
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however, safeguards against prosecutorial abuse since govern-
ment attorneys can face disciplinary proceedings for withhold-
ing exculpatory evidence 258 and since failure to disclose mate-
rial, exculpatory evidence will result in mistrial or reversal. A
prosecutor can protect himself and the verdict by submitting
such questions of "materiality" to the judge before trial as has
been suggested by the U.S. Supreme Court.259 The Court has
even gone so far as to state that: "When the prosecutor receives
a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any re-
sponse is seldom, if ever, excusable. 20
A further limitation on the use of the Brady rule for discov-
ery is the narrow definition of "materiality" established by the
Court in United States v. Agurs.2 6' In Agurs the Court held that
before failure to disclose evidence results in constitutional error
as a denial of due process under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, the omitted evidence must be viewed in the con-
text of the whole record and must create "a reasonable doubt
that did not otherwise exist. 2 2 The Court did recognize, how-
ever, that in close cases, "additional evidence of relatively
minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable
doubt. 1263 Heretofore, it had been suggested that the logical
extension of Brady required disclosure of any evidence which
Giles, 212 A.2d 101, 109 (Md. 1965) also quoted in Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 80
(1967).
The reverse question is more problematic: To what extent does defense counsel
have a duty to disclose incriminating evidence? In State ex rel Sowers v. Olwell, 394
P.2d 681 (Wash. 1964), defense counsel obtained a knife belonging to the defendant
and apparently used in the homicide with which he was charged. The state supreme
court held that due to the attorney-client privilege, the attorney could not be required
to disclose how he got the knife; however, he did have an obligation to turn the weapon
over to the prosecution.
", Code of Professional Responsbility, DR 7-101 (b).
A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall
make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or to the defendant if
he has no counsel, of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or
other government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused,
mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment. See also ABA
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
§3.11 (1970).
2 United States v. Agurs, -U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2399 (1976).
263 Id.
261 Id.
2 Id. at 2401.
263 Id. at 2402.
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might have aided the defense or affected the outcome of the
trial.2"4 The Court specifically rejected this interpretation and
further stated that it would not require the prosecution as a
matter of constitutional law "routinely to deliver his entire file
to defense counsel. '285 The two lone dissenters in the case, Mar-
shall and Brennan, objected to the standard proposed by the
majority because, they charged, the rule "reinforces the natu-
ral tendency of the prosecutor to overlook evidence favorable
to the defense" 266 and leaves the question of reasonable doubt
not to the jury but to the reviewing judge.2 7 The majority
argued that rather than suppressing possible material evidence
the "prudent prosecutor" would resolve questions in favor of
disclosure. 216 It should also be noted that Agurs established a
constitutional duty upon the prosecutor to provide material,
exculpatory evidence regardless of whether the defense has
made a request for all "exculpatory" or "Brady" material. 29
Finally, it should be recognized that many prosecutors are
willing to make voluntary pretrial disclosures. Prosecutors
most often disclose material to defendants because they trust
the defense counsel with whom they have a good working rela-
tionship or they believe disclosure will lead to a guilty plea.270
211 See n. 257, supra.
21 United States v. Agurs, -U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2401 (1976).
21 Id. at 2404 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
2S7 Id.
2I Id. at 2399.
219 Id.
211 In a survey of 14 assistant United States Attorneys and 17 defense counsels in
the District of Columbia, the following were factors most often thought to have a
substantial affect on the prosecutor's decision as to whether to grant informal discov-
ery:
Defense
Prosecutor Counsel
1. U.S. Attorney's personal acquaintance
with defense counsel
2. Likelihood of a guilty plea 79% 94%
3. Material available by formal motion 79% 52%
4. Defendant's willingness to disclose his defenses 57% 53%
5. Preponderance of evidence against the defendant 57% 82%
6. Defendant's ability to get the same information
elsewhere
7. U.S. Attorney's opinion of defendant's guilt 2917 24%
8. Availability of material under the Jencks Act 21% 24%
9. Indigency of defendant 7% 53%
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Such a system of informal pretrial discovery appears arbitrary
and capricious on its face. 1 Furthermore, as noted by Justice
Brennan, this "system" has definite "overtones of denial of
equal protection . . . . [T]he opportunity for discovery on
equal terms should either be the right of all accused, or the
right of none. 2 7
The prosecution also has discovery devices outside the spe-
cific discovery rules. As already discussed, the Commonwealth
has vast investigatory resources at its disposal, as well as the
grand jury procedure by which it can subpoena witnesses and
compel testimony. 3 Because grand jury proceedings are se-
cret, 7' the prosecutor has an opportunity to explore the case
outside the presence of the defendant.
Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 41, 116 (1963). See also Comment, In
Search of the Adversary System-The Cooperative Practices of Private Criminal De-
fense Attorneys, 50 TEx. L. REv. 60 (1971).
2' The whimsical nature of this type of voluntary disclosure was underlined by
one prosecutor who stated that whether he makes disclosures "depends largely on the
type of case and the type of defendant." No other criteria were suggested. Flannery,
supra note 33, at 74-82. Moreover, the informality of this procedure was stressed in the
following testimony:
Legal Aid attorneys will never press for a preliminary hearing, and never
even make a discovery motion of any kind. But because of the relationship
of trust and confidence that exists between the particular men who are there
representing the defendants through the Legal Aid Society and the assistants
(to the federal prosecutor), there is a great deal of informal discovery, and I
do mean informal. It is a matter of sitting in a lunchroom and the Legal Aid
attorney saying, what do you have on so and so, and the Assistant U.S.
Attorney will tell him.
Hearings on the United States Commissioner System Before The Subcommittee on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 3, at 223-24 (1966). Such informality smacks of wheeling and deal-
ing in the "good ole boys" club. One must wonder whether women, blacks and other
minority attorneys who are not traditional members of this "club" fare so well on
behalf of their clients. For a discussion of the "Old Boys Act," a procedure of informal
prosecutorial disclosure used in England, see Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in
Criminal Discovery in England, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 749, 767 (1964).
272 Brennan, Remarks on Discovery, supra note 37, at 58-59.
"' Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1191 (1960). The prosecution can subpoena witnesses
before the grand jury, Ky. R. Ca. 5.06, and compel their testimony. Ky. R. Ca. 5.12.
"I Ky. R. CR. 5.18, 5.24. See also Blakemore v. Commonwealth, 497 S.W.2d 231,
235 (Ky. 1973); Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d 497, 498 (Ky. 1972).
CONUNDRUM OF CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
V. CONCLUSION
Few seriously dispute the value of pretrial discovery in
ensuring that truth and not the best gamesman wins out in the
courtroom. The inequity of continuing a criminal justice sys-
tem in which surprise is too often the rule is evident. Unfairness
always calls to question the integrity of the system and thus the
soundness of the justice it metes out. A mature society cannot
tolerate criminal prosecution being conducted as a game. To
take such a frivolous approach to the adjudication of criminal
cases invites disillusionment with and disrespect for the entire
criminal justice system and the goals it espouses.
The real issue, however, is not the inherent value or need
for criminal discovery. Nor is it the elimination of
gamesmanship from the adjudication process; these are gener-
ally accepted. The basic issue today is the extent of criminal
discovery and the conditions to be placed upon it.
Comparison of the Kentucky rules of criminal discovery
with the federal rules and ABA standards reveals that Ken-
tucky criminal discovery is not yet as broad as the ABA stan-
dards, especially in the area of disclosure of names and state-
ments of prospective prosecution witnesses to the defense, but
that it is commensurate with the defense discovery available
in the federal system. While the "surprise witness" is still a
possibility in Kentucky courts, criminal discovery is broad
enough to prevent the defendant's total surprise at trial.
Kentucky's criminal discovery scheme differs most signifi-
cantly from the ABA standards and federal rules in the area of
discovery by the prosecution. While the ABA standards view
prosecution discovery as a necessary trade-off in return for
broader defense discovery,25 the federal rules have granted
broader prosecution discovery, the alibi notice rule, for exam-
ple, without giving any significantly broadened opportunities
for discovery by the defense.
Kentucky has at times patterned its rules of criminal pro-
cedure on the federal rules.7 6 On the issue of prosecution dis-
' ABA STANDARDS, DiscoVERY, supra note 4, at Supplement 3-6.
'7 See James v. Commonwealth, 482 S.W.2d 92, 94 at n. 1 (Ky. 1972) in which
the Kentucky Court acknowledged that "Federal Rule 16(a) is almost identical with
[Kentucky Criminal Rule] 7.24(1)."
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covery, however, it would be the wiser course not to follow the
federal lead. As for the ABA standards, the courts and defense
bar must consider whether broader defense discovery is worth
the price of greater prosecution discovery. Probably it is not.
Rather, the Kentucky Court should adopt a philosophy of
liberal criminal discovery to insure that cases are decided
upon truth and not upon tactical surprises without adopting
rules which would erode the safeguards of the privilege against
self-incrimination.
Rebecca Westerfield
